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Abstract
Modelling the Dynamics of the Bitcoin Blockchain
M. Mwale
Department of Mathematical Sciences,Computer Science Division,
University of Stellenbosch,
Private Bag X1, Matieland 7602, South Africa.
Thesis: MSc (Computer Science)
December 2015
Bitcoin is a peer to peer (P2P) electronic payment system proposed by
Nakamoto in 2008. Central to the operation of Bitcoin is the blockchain, which
is, in essence, a public ledger of all transactions. The blockchain is maintained
by a group of volunteers called miners, who are rewarded with bitcoins for
successfully mining blocks. Mining a block involves collecting and validating
transactions, adding validated transactions to a block, and ﬁnally adding the
block to the blockchain and broadcasting the block to the peer network.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the proﬁtability of block discarding
attacks in the Bitcoin network. To this end, we developed a discrete event
simulator to model the dynamics of the blockchain. We use a simplistic network
model where all participants are miners. Initially, our investigation focusses
on a model where all miners are honest, following the Bitcoin rules, and all
block transmissions are subject to delays. We show that the delays cause forks
to occur in the blockchain, which are quickly resolved. The simulation results
for our network model closely agree with those observed from the real Bitcoin
network.
We then examine a block discarding attack referred to as selﬁsh-mine [32],
where it is claimed that a small group of colluding miners can subvert the
Bitcoin protocol. We evaluate this claim using relative revenue (the fraction of
the total revenue that is credited to the pool of colluding miners) and conﬁrmed
blocks (the absolute number of blocks credited to the pool of colluding miners
at the end of a mining period) for the case where there is instantaneous block
transmission, and the case where block transmission is subject to delays. We
show that this claim is true for the ﬁrst case. However, for the latter case,
selﬁsh-mine is only proﬁtable (in terms of the relative revenue) when the pool
commands more than 30% of the total computing power of the network. We
ii
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further show that a higher relative revenue does not necessarily entail a larger
number of conﬁrmed blocks and that the presence of selﬁsh-mine causes both
the honest and the dishonest miners to fare worse.
Finally we present a generalized form of selﬁsh-mine, representing a greater
variety of block discarding attacks, and use a genetic algorithm to search for
an optimal conﬁguration of the generalized selﬁsh-mine that yields a better
performance for the pool. We attempt to maximize either the relative revenue
or the number of conﬁrmed blocks. Our results show that the generalized
form of selﬁsh-mine when optimally conﬁgured yields better performance than
standard selﬁsh-mine, both in terms of the relative revenue and conﬁrmed
blocks.
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Uittreksel
Modellering die dinamika van die Bitcoin Blockchain
(Modeling the Dynamics of the Bitcoin Blockchain)
M. Mwale
Departement Wiskundige Wetenskappe,Rekenaarwetenskap Afdeling,
Universiteit van Stellenbosch,
Privaatsak X1, Matieland 7602, Suid Afrika.
Tesis: MSc (Computer Science)
Desember 2015
Bitcoin is 'n stelsel vir elektroniese betalings van portuur tot portuur (P2P)
waarmee Nakamoto in 2008 vorendag gekom het. Die werking van Bitcoin draai
om die blokketting, wat in wese 'n openbare grootboek van alle transaksies
is. Die blokketting word bygehou deur 'n groep vrywilligers wat as myners
bekend is, wat met bitcoins beloon word indien hulle blokke suksesvol ontgin.
Die ontginning van 'n blok behels die insameling en stawing van transaksies,
waarna gestaafde transaksies by 'n blok bygevoeg, die blok aan die blokketting
gehaak en dan na die P2Pnetwerk versend word.
Die doel van hierdie tesis is om die winsgewendheid van blokverwerp-
ingsaanvalle in die Bitcoin-netwerk te ondersoek. Hiervoor is 'n diskrete gebeurtenis-
simuleerder ontwikkel om die dinamiek van die blokketting te modelleer. 'n
Simplistiese netwerkmodel word gebruik waarin alle deelnemers myners is.
Aanvanklik konsentreer die ondersoek op 'n model waarin alle myners eerlik
is en die Bitcoin-reëls volg, en waarin alle blokversendings aan vertragings
onderworpe is. Daar word aangetoon dat die vertragings vertakkings in die
blokketting veroorsaak, wat vinnig uitgestryk word. Die simulasieresultate
uit die netwerkmodel stem grootliks ooreen met wat in die werklike Bitcoin-
netwerk waargeneem word.
Daarna word 'n blokverwerpingsaanval wat as `selfsugtige ontginning' bek-
end is [32], ondersoek, waar 'n klein groep myners na bewering kan saamspan
om die Bitcoin-protokol te ondermyn. Hierdie bewering word beoordeel aan
die hand van relatiewe inkomste (die fraksie van totale inkomste wat aan die
betrokke groep myners toegeskryf kan word) en bevestigde blokke (die absolute
getal blokke wat aan die einde van 'n ontginningstydperk aan die groep myn-
ers toegeskryf kan word) in 'n scenario van onmiddellike blokversending sowel
iv
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as 'n scenario waar blokversending aan vertragings onderworpe is. Daar word
aangetoon dat hierdie bewering waar is in die eerste scenario. In die tweede
scenario is selfsugtige ontginning slegs winsgewend (wat relatiewe inkomste be-
tref) indien die groep meer as 30% van die algehele berekeningsvermoë van die
netwerk beheer. Die studie toon ook dat 'n hoër relatiewe inkomste nie nood-
wendig 'n groter getal bevestigde blokke behels nie, en dat die aanwesigheid
van selfsugtige ontginning eerlike sowel as oneerlike myners se prestasie ver-
swak.
Laastens word 'n veralgemeende vorm van selfsugtige ontginning aangebied
wat 'n groter verskeidenheid blokverwerpingsaanvalle voorstel. 'n Genetiese
algoritme word gebruik om 'n optimale konﬁgurasie van die veralgemeende
selfsugtige ontginning te bepaal wat 'n beter prestasie vir die groep oplewer.
Hiervoor probeer die navorser hetsy die relatiewe inkomste of die getal beves-
tigde blokke maksimaliseer. Die resultate toon dat die veralgemeende vorm van
selfsugtige ontginning in die optimale konﬁgurasie beter prestasie as standaard-
selfsugtige ontginning oplewer wat relatiewe inkomste sowel as bevestigde blokke
betref.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Bitcoin1 is a decentralized peer to peer electronic payment system based on
cryptography or more accurately, a crypto-currency. The Bitcoin economy has
grown at an incredibly fast rate with a current estimated market capitalization
of about 3.5 billion US dollars since its introduction in 2009 [10]. While Bitcoin
is still in its infancy and more of an experimental than an accepted currency,
the trends suggest that it has the potential to shape the future of electronic
payments.
In the Bitcoin system (to be discussed in detail later), mining is the activity
which creates new bitcoins which are later put into circulation. Nodes called
miners expend resources such as electricity on solving cryptographic puzzles
and validate the Bitcoin transactions of other people. Veriﬁed transactions
are grouped into what is known as a block. These blocks are added to the
blockchain which is essentially a public distributed ledger of all Bitcoin trans-
actions. It cannot be overemphasized that the integrity of the blockchain must
be preserved at all times. The blockchain is maintained through consensus and
the entity or entities with 51% of the total computing power of the network
determine the correct version of the blockchain. The basic claim of Bitcoin is
that as long as no one entity controls more than 50% of the total computing
power of the network, the currency will remain decentralized [54]. It has been
shown, however, that this claim relies on the premise that miners are honest
and follow the protocol rules [4, 23, 32, 40, 65]. More recently, and compounded
by the emergence of mining pools such as GHash.IO2 which contributes close
to 30% of the total computing power of the network at the time of writing,
1Throughout this thesis, Bitcoin (upper case) refers to the Bitcoin system while bitcoin
(lower case) refers to the currency coin.
2GHash.IO is the largest Bitcoin mining pool which allows mining bitcoins with personal
hardware or cloud-based mining power, collectively mining bitcoins worth a total exceeding
$200 million in its ﬁrst year of operation.
1
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much attention has been paid to attacks on the Bitcoin network that can be
broadly classiﬁed as block withholding and block discarding attacks [4].
1.2 Related Work
The idea of a successful subversive strategy with less than 50% of the total
computing power of the Bitcoin network is not a recent one and can be traced
to the early days of the system. One of the ﬁrst attacks discussed is the double
spending attack that Nakamoto [54] addressed in the original Bitcoin paper.
Several subversive strategies have since been proposed and discussed over the
years of Bitcoin's unprecedented growth compared to other crypto-currencies.
More recently, much attention has gone into strategies that are broadly
classiﬁed as block withholding and block discarding attacks [4]. It is interesting
to note that the same subversive strategy that [32] proposes is also discussed
independently by [4]. While [32] calls it selﬁsh-mine, [4] refers to it as st1, a
part of a larger stk, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞, family of block discarding attacks. The
conclusion made by [4] is that the st1 attack is proﬁtable if the total computing
power p of the attacker is
p >
1− ns
3− 2ns (1.1)
where ns is what they refer to as network superiority3 and [32] concludes that
selﬁsh-mine is proﬁtable when the total computing power α of the selﬁsh pool
is bounded as
1− γ
3− 2γ < α <
1
2
(1.2)
where γ is the fraction of the honest nodes that mine on the published block (a
previously secret block mined by the dishonest pool) when there is a race. A
race4 occurs when more than one competing block is added to the blockchain
(one block having been mined by the attackers, the other block having been
mined by an honest node) causing the blockchain to fork (have multiple branches
of equal length) but eventually one branch wins (the branch on which the next
block is mined). Notwithstanding the diﬀerences in approach and terminology,
both analyses come to the same conclusion. It is further shown in [4] that any
strategy stk+1 is more proﬁtable than stk. Thus st2 or any stk where k > 1, is
more proﬁtable than st1 (selﬁsh-mine), which in turn, is more proﬁtable than
st0 (honest mining).
An analysis of the selﬁsh-mine strategy is given in [23, 35]. The authors of
[23] suggest that the claims of [32] are exaggerated, giving a number of reasons
3Deﬁned as follows: when an honest miner mines a new block and the attacker is quickly
informed of it and tries to release a competitive block as fast as she can, ns is the probability
of the event that the next block mined by the honest network on top of either of the
competitive blocks, will be on top of the attacker's block [23].
4It is a race for which branch gets extended in the next round of mining.
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for their position. The key issues raised about the selﬁsh-mine strategy as
presented in [32] are:
1. The assumption that there is only one dishonest pool and that all mem-
bers of the pool follow the pool rules. There is no incentive to prevent
multiple pools from forming and we show later that this has a nega-
tive eﬀect on the success of the selﬁsh-mine strategy. In addition, just
because members joined the pool does not mean that they will behave
according to the pool rules.
2. There is no evidence that miners in the Bitcoin network as at present
actually mine on the ﬁrst block they received as claimed by [32] which is
a key aspect of the proposed selﬁsh-mine strategy. While Bitcoin is an
open source project, currently the code of a great majority of miners is
closed and to assume that no improvements or optimizations have been
made would be presumptuous.
The remarks above are made by the authors of [23] without any supporting
experimental results. On the other hand, the authors of [35] focus on both
mathematical models and simulation models to analyze the performance of the
selﬁsh-mine strategy speciﬁcally under block propagation delays. They use a
simple Markov model to track the states of the blockchain in the presence of
block discarding attacks such as selﬁsh-mine. In addition, the authors of [35]
use a spatial Poisson model to analyze the values of γ in [32] and complement
their analysis with simulation studies.
All the works mentioned above argue that the theoretical limit of the at-
tackers' fraction of total computing power essential for the security of the sys-
tem in the current Bitcoin speciﬁcation is not 50% as claimed by Nakamoto,
but much less. Bahack [4] claims that it is a little less than 25% and outlines
proposals for protocol changes that can raise this limit to be as close to 50%
as possible. On the other hand, [32] claims the threshold is as low as 10% and
proposes changes that raise this threshold to 25%. Heilman [40] discusses the
selﬁsh-mine strategy and claims to raise the threshold of mining power nec-
essary to proﬁtably selﬁshly mine from 25% to 32% by employing the use of
unforgeable timestamps. The author further claims that the changes proposed
are robust even when the timestamps are forged.
The selﬁsh-mine and other subversive strategies discussed above depend
on the longest chain rule which is an inherent part of Bitcoin and most other
Bitcoin-like systems. The longest chain is adopted by miners when there is a
fork in the blockchain. A fork can be caused by block propagation delays or by
an attacker following a subversive strategy. Decker and Wattenhofer [26] give
a detailed analysis of block propagation delays and fork rate in the Bitcoin
network. Since the honest miners cannot distinguish between an innocent fork
and one caused by an attacker, the attacker who can extend his chain longer
than the rest of the network can beneﬁt from a subversive strategy. According
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to [22], this rule could, in fact, be an engineering mistake that other similar
currencies have copied without deeper consideration of its implications.
Further work on attacks in the Bitcoin network can be found in [32, 43,
57, 63]. The authors of [57] and [63] perform an analysis of more optimal
mining strategies than selﬁsh-mine. In [63], the optimization of selﬁsh-mine
using an MDP approach is performed and it is further shown that adhering to
the longest chain rule is not always the best option. The authors of [57] com-
bine selﬁsh-mine-like strategies with network level attacks such as an eclipse
attack5. Both the authors of [57] and [63] conclude that there are more prof-
itable strategies than selﬁsh-mine as proposed in [32]. On the other hand, both
[31] and [43] focus on attacks that are tailored towards pools (selﬁsh or non
selﬁsh pools) in the Bitcoin network. While both [31] and [43] use game the-
oretical analysis, [43] focusses on DDoS attacks, and [31] on sabotage attacks
that aim to reduce the revenue of the attacked pool.
1.3 Subject of Thesis
1.3.1 Background and Problem Statement
In 2013, Eyal and Sirer published a paper [32] in which a claim is made that
Bitcoin mining is vulnerable and that a small group of colluding miners can
subvert the protocol. The strategy presented in the paper is referred to as
selﬁsh-mine. Selﬁsh-mine6 if eﬀective, allows a pool of colluding miners to
earn more than their fair share of the mining revenue. The basic idea is that
miners in the pool gain advantage by withholding blocks they discover from the
rest of the network (honest miners) thereby causing the honest miners to waste
their eﬀort mining blocks that are destined not to be in the main branch of
the blockchain. It is further claimed that a small group of miners commanding
less than 10% of the total computing power of the network can subvert the
protocol contrary to Bitcoin's claim that as long as the majority of miners
remain honest, the protocol cannot be subverted. Bahack [4] discusses the
same strategy although the threshold required for success is 25% as opposed
to 10% of the total computing power. The model presented in [32] makes a
number of assumptions. We make note of the following:
1. The model presented does not take block propagation delays into ac-
count. It is shown by Decker and Wattenhofer [26] that the average
block propagation delay in the Bitcoin network is 12.6 seconds.
5An eclipse attack is an attack in P2P overlay networks where an attacker monopolizes
all the incoming and outgoing connections of a victim thereby isolating the victim from the
rest of the network.
6The terms selﬁsh-mine, dishonest mining, and selﬁsh mining are used interchangeably
through this thesis.
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2. It is assumed that only one pool in the network follows the selﬁsh-mine
strategy. Currently, there are several mining pools present in the Bitcoin
network and as mentioned earlier, there is no reason to expect that only
one pool would follow a block withholding strategy.
With the above assumptions and observations made in the section on re-
lated work, we are not convinced that the selﬁsh-mine attack is as viable as
presented in [32] let alone if it would be proﬁtable in the real Bitcoin network.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine these claims and verify whether the
claims are accurate while using a model that more faithfully represents how
the Bitcoin network operates. To that end, we wish to:
1. Investigate whether selﬁsh-mine, as proposed in [32], is proﬁtable when
there are block propagation delays.
2. Verify the threshold required for selﬁsh-mine to be proﬁtable.
3. Investigate how proﬁtable selﬁsh-mine is when more than one pool is fol-
lowing the selﬁsh-mine strategy and what eﬀect this has on the threshold
in 2 above.
4. Explore whether the selﬁsh-mine strategy can be optimized to be more
proﬁtable.
Furthermore, we hope that the insight gained through this study will help in
formulating means as to how these attacks can be detected and/or deterred.
1.3.2 Rationale
Bitcoin is not the only electronic currency in existence and neither the ﬁrst
to be conceived. However, the success of Bitcoin speaks for itself [6] and it
has enormous potential to change how businesses conduct their business. Its
application in international money transfers, pay as you go services, micro-
payments, dispute mediation, multi-signature accounts, online gaming, and
online shopping is still being explored. Bitcoin is quickly gaining recognition
on the African content. There are innovations such as BitPesa [12] in Kenya,
Kipochi [20] in South Africa, BitPay [11] in many countries, including African
countries such as Sierra Leone that demonstrate that Bitcoin can improve dig-
ital payment systems. Developing economies, especially in Africa are suited
for Bitcoin due to the generally unstable currencies and high charges levied on
customers. In addition, a lack of means to do online transactions is generally
prevalent in Africa. Bitcoin, therefore, presents an opportunity to revolution-
ize this area. However, before Bitcoin can be fully accepted, it must be shown
that the protocol is robust and secure, among other things. This will increase
the level of conﬁdence in the transactions and the overall Bitcoin economy, po-
tentially making Bitcoin a platform that can change how electronic commerce
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and digital payments are currently being done notwithstanding the political,
policy and legal issues that are yet to be fully resolved. We hope that this the-
sis will contribute towards demonstrating the stability or instability of Bitcoin
and thereby contributing to future improvements to the system.
1.4 Thesis Outline
This thesis is arranged into seven chapters as follows:
 Chapter 1: Introduction
 Chapter 2: Currencies and Payment Systems
 Chapter 3: Bitcoin
 Chapter 4: Simulation of the Bitcoin Protocol
 Chapter 5: Selﬁsh-Mine
 Chapter 6: Genetic Optimization of Selﬁsh-Mine
 Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusions
This chapter gives an overview of the problem being addressed. Chapter 2
presents an outline of the evolution of currencies with a section dedicated to
digital currencies and digital payment systems. Chapter 3 discusses Bitcoin
and gives some details of its operation. In Chapter 4, the simulation frame-
work and model is introduced and the results of simulation experiments of the
Bitcoin protocol when all miners follow the protocol rules are presented. Chap-
ter 5 brings us to selﬁsh-mine. Here a discussion of the selﬁsh-mine strategy
and its evaluation using the simulation framework is presented. In Chapter 6
we discuss optimization of the selﬁsh-mine strategy using Genetic Algorithm
optimization. Finally, Chapter 7 gives a summary and conclusion.
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Currencies and Payment Systems
2.1 Currency: A historical Perspective
The need for people to exchange goods and services has long existed even
before money as we know it today was invented. Throughout time, people
have devised ways to make trade or exchange of goods more convenient. The
barter system is the most ancient and primitive form of trade. In a barter
economy, no notion of money existed. Goods were exchanged directly. One
needed to ﬁnd an individual who had the goods you were looking for and at the
same time was in need of the goods you had. It is easy to see how diﬃcult the
exchange of goods was in this economy. Naturally people sought a better way
of exchange; one that was universal. This gave rise to commodity currencies.
2.1.1 Commodity currencies
The idea of money originated in this era albeit in a primitive form. In this
economy, there was some universal equivalent (used as money) which was
normally another good. This good was used to measure the value of all other
goods. In ancient Europe, for example, they used cattle as the universal equiv-
alent from whence the Latin word pecunia (meaning money) ﬁnds its roots1.
The worth of any good would be assessed in comparison to cattle [25]. For
example, 5 goats = 1 cow or 10kg corn = 1 cow. In this sense, cattle played
the role of money. Other societies used leather, oil, beer, to mention a few
examples.
2.1.2 Coins
Despite the improvement achieved through commodity currencies, the goods
used as currency in the commodity currency economy were still not convenient
to carry around due to their size and weight. Over time, the use of metal coins
1The word pecunia is derived from the Latin word pecus which means cattle.
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as a medium of exchange was developed. The value of the metal coin was
based on the intrinsic value of the metal used to make the coin. For example,
a gold coin would have a higher value than a silver coin and other coins made
from metals of lesser value. From around 1000 B.C, artifacts similar to coins
such as small knives had been used in China. However, the ﬁrst real coins were
made and used around 560 B.C in a country called Lydia, a part of what is
presently known as Turkey [5]. The coins were stamped with the King's seal.
Similar innovations were taking place around the same time in cities in India,
China and regions surrounding the Aegean sea.
2.1.3 Goldsmiths and Convertible Token Money
The Goldsmiths ﬁrst introduced a concept that had the semblance of a central
clearing authority for money [25]. In this economy, the Goldsmiths would
keep your gold in their vaults and in exchange give you a piece of paper that
certiﬁed that they owed you a certain amount of gold. This was an assurance to
everyone that the bearer (of the paper) had a certain amount of gold in holding
and hence the paper could be used to claim the actual gold. Consequently, the
piece of paper could be used to trade.
With the passage of time, people started to use cheaper metals or pieces of
paper that could be exchanged not for their intrinsic value but for the value
that was printed on them. In this economy, the token (either a piece of paper
or a metallic coin) was not worth much in that it had no intrinsic value, but
it was used as money because it was backed by commodity money (gold or
silver) at a ﬁxed exchange rate. The token money would be exchanged with
the issuer of the currency; the Goldsmiths. This is how the gold standard
came into being.
2.1.4 Paper Money
The Chinese were the ﬁrst to use paper money [7, 25, 39]. The ﬂying cash of
the Tang (618-907) dynasty named so because of its tendency to be blown by
the wind was used around 800 A.D. Metal coins were then referred to as cash
and not the paper money. The paper money was issued by the government
originally for transit purposes when moving large amounts of cash over long
distances since coins were heavy and inconvenient to carry. It was not a `legal
tender' but over time, merchants began using them as a convenient method of
exchange [28].
The paper money was used during the S'ung (960-1279) dynasty and was
extended to include paper certiﬁcates. Each note was sealed with a seal speciﬁc
to one of the sixteen note-issuing houses making counterfeiting diﬃcult. Using
a mix of inks, the notes had pictures of houses, trees and people printed on
them. They became widely circulated and eventually people started accepting
them for many forms of payments. European explorers introduced the concept
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of paper money in Europe in the 13th century and John Law was a pioneer of
paper money in Europe in the 1700s.
John Law [1] was an economist of Scottish origin, born into a family of
bankers and goldsmiths. He was an avid gambler and originated economic
ideas such as the scarcity theory of value and the real bills doctrine. Law
is known to have espoused the following views,
 that money creation would stimulate the economy,
 that paper money is preferable to coins (which should be banned) and
 that shares are a superior form of money since they pay dividends.
In 1716, Law's plan of a centralized bank that he presented to the Banque
Générale in France was approved. This resulted in the founding of a private
bank, Banque Générale Privé, that allowed investors to supply 25% of an
investment in currency and the remainder in defunct government bonds. It
was this bank which developed the use of paper money in France. In addition,
the bank was allowed to issue its own currency backed by Louis of gold.
With this establishment and France's investment in terms of company stock
in the Mississippi Company, Law was able to make a reality of the monopoly
companies he envisioned. However, the Mississippi company was a fraud that
eventually failed and led to France being bankrupt and many individuals losing
millions of livres. John Law died a bankrupt man. Around the same time, a
similar public-private partnership undertaking was done by Great Britain that
allowed the South Sea Company to fraudulently monopolize trade with South
America. This venture met with an equally catastrophic failure resulting in
the national economy of Great Britain being reduced considerably.
2.1.5 The Gold Standard
As was mentioned in previous sections, through time, various commodities
such as gold and silver were used as money. Gold was used as money for
thousands of years since it loses less value over time. This is because gold is
generally a scarce commodity with a limited supply. The gold standard is one
such monetary system in which the value of a unit of the currency is based
on a ﬁxed quantity of gold. Up until the 20th century, one could exchange
an amount of money for a ﬁxed quantity of gold at central banks in most
countries. The US abandoned the gold standard in 1971. The gold standard
has since been abandoned by countries across the globe. In its place, we have
ﬁat currencies.
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2.1.6 Fiat Currencies
Fiat2 money is a currency whose value is drawn from government regulation.
Fiat money is distinct from other types of money, such as commodity money
and representative money. Commodity money as the name suggests is based
on a good (commodity). Usually, the commodity in question has other uses
besides being a medium of exchange. Examples of commodities that have been
used are gold and silver. Representative money, on the other hand, is a claim
on the commodity rather than the actual good, for example, gold certiﬁcates
[48]. Fiat money exists solely because of the government's power. Fiat money
was introduced in China around 1000 AD. It has since been used by various
countries, concurrently with commodity currencies.
2.2 Electronic Payment Systems
The advances in currencies or money have brought about the need to secure
money and transactions through payment systems. A payment system [67] is
an operational network that provides the means for exchange of monetary value
between entities discharging mutual obligations, normally using bank deposits.
It consists of the infrastructure and regulatory framework established to enable
such mutual exchange to take place. The infrastructure consists of institutions
and technical means [15] while the regulatory framework consists of the rules,
procedures and standards. Payment systems include both electronic payment
systems such as EFT or debit cards and the more traditional ones employ the
use of physical instruments such as cheques.
Traditional payment systems could not cope with the needs of modern
society, hence the emergence of their electronic counterparts. The growth of
e-commerce resulting from the almost ubiquitous Internet has brought about
the need for secure payment systems for transactions done on the Internet.
Notwithstanding this, electronic payment systems go beyond a means for mak-
ing payments on the Internet. Several kinds of electronic payment systems
exist today. The important ones are brieﬂy described below. A comparative
overview of some of these payment systems is explored in [47].
2.2.1 Cards
Cards outweigh by far other forms of electronic payment systems in terms of
usage and popularity. The types of cards found on the current market are
credit, debit, and prepaid cards. Typically cards have a magnetic strip on
the back where information about the card holder is recorded. More recently,
cards are ﬁtted with a smart chip. The card is normally issued by a ﬁnancial
2Fiat is the Latin word for the third-person singular present active subjunctive of ﬁõ (I
become, I am made).
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institution which employs a central clearing authority for all transactions made
using the card. With the services oﬀered by Visa, MasterCard and Euro,
one no longer needs to use a machine that is speciﬁc to the issuer (ﬁnancial
institution) making access to electronic money convenient. The card holder
can use the card to draw cash or make payments at payment points while
shopping for goods and/or services. Credit cards are particularly popular in
more advanced economies because they typically allow payments which may
not be available on some prepaid and debit cards.
2.2.2 Internet
A discussion on electronic payment systems cannot be complete without the
mention of Internet payments. Many businesses have an online presence which
makes shopping at a click of a button possible. Internet payments usually
involve a person making a purchase online. When using Internet payments,
customers can transfer money directly from their bank accounts (EFT) or
use a card. Cards are usually preferred when making online purchases. As
e-commerce grows, so will this payment system. Besides making purchases,
Internet payments also include facilities that Internet banking normally oﬀers
such as SWIFT transfer [68].
2.2.3 Mobile Payments
Mobile banking is now almost a de facto standard for any bank. There is a
constraint on the kind of transactions that can be carried out via a mobile
phone. However, mobile phones still can be used to facilitate some electronic
transactions. The customer can access their electronic money using a mobile
phone, make payments, transfer funds, etc. Some mobile service providers have
gone a step further to allow their customers to have a kind of a bank account
based on the customer's MSISDN (Mobile Station International Subscriber
Directory Number). Funds can be deposited into these accounts and then
accessed later to carry out transactions normally through SMS/USSD3. This
is generally referred to as mobile money. Examples are M-Pesa [73], MTN
Money [53], Ecocash [29] to mention a few.
2.2.4 Person-to-Person Payments
Examples of institutions that facilitate such payments are PayPal [60] and
Moneybookers [52]. When using these payment systems, the usual mechanism
used as a store of value is a prepaid card. These mechanisms of the store of
value are linked to an online account such as a PayPal account in such a way
3Unstructured Supplementary Services Data (USSD) is a protocol used in GSM net-
works, for example, when a user dials ∗111#
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that a person can pay another person using the online account as if the money
were stored there. These provide an alternative for customers with no access
to credit cards as these services can be accessed easily and securely over the
Internet [16].
2.3 Electronic and Crypto-Currencies
A digital or electronic currency is an electronic medium of exchange. Most of
the traditional money supply that is materialized as banknotes or coins has
a digital side in that its value is often stored on a bank's computers. Due
to our increasingly cashless society, one could argue that all currencies are
becoming digital even though they may not be presented to us as such [30].
A digital currency exhibits properties similar to physical currencies, but may
not necessarily exhibit all the properties, for example, its use may be accepted
only in a restricted community. It allows for real-time transactions that are not
constrained by physical borders [30]. Virtual currencies and crypto-currencies
are types of electronic currencies.
1. A virtual currency is a non-governmental regulated digital currency that
is usually accepted for use within a restricted community. It is controlled
and issued by its developers. The US Department of Treasury in 2013
deﬁned it more tersely as a medium of exchange that operates like a
currency in some environments but fails to meet all the attributes of real
currency. It is clear from these deﬁnitions that a virtual currency lacks
the key attribute of being legal tender (a legally recognized instrument
for meeting ﬁnancial obligations).
2. A crypto-currency is a medium of exchange that uses cryptography to
secure transactions and to generate new currency units. It is a kind
of alternative currency. Most crypto-currencies are decentralized peer
to peer systems (as opposed to centralized electronic currency systems,
such as PayPal) that often employ the use of a public ledger (such as the
Bitcoin blockchain) to record transactions.
Bitcoin became the ﬁrst decentralized crypto-currency in 2009. Numerous
crypto-currencies have been created since then. The alternative crypto-currencies
launched after the success of Bitcoin are frequently called altcoins. A few key
ones are brieﬂy discussed in the following sections and in Table 2.1 [33, 38].
2.3.1 Litecoin
The second largest crypto-currency in the world is Litecoin [38], created by
Charlie Lee, an MIT graduate, and former Google engineer. It was launched
2 years after Bitcoin in 2011. Like Bitcoin, Litecoin [33] is based on an open
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Table 2.1: Altcoins Summary.
Comparison of Bitcoin with Altcoins
Currency Deﬂationary Blockchain Proof of Work Created
Bitcoin Yes Yes SHA-256 2009
Primecoin No Yes Cunningham chains 2009
Litecoin Yes Yes Scrypt 2011
Peercoin No Yes SHA-256 2012
Dogecoin No Yes Scrypt 2013
Darkcoin Yes Yes X11 2014
source global payment network that is not controlled by any central authority
but uses scrypt as a proof of work. Unlike Bitcoin which requires specialized
ASIC computers to demonstrate proof of work, CPUs of consumer grade can
be used in Litecoin. It has a faster block generation rate as well as more
rewards per block compared to Bitcoin [38].
2.3.2 Darkcoin
Launched in January 2014 [27], created and developed by Evan Duﬃeld, Dark-
coin is a more secretive version of Bitcoin. Although bitcoins are said to be
anonymous, this is largely true only in comparison to traditional money. Since
the blockchain keeps a history of all transactions ever carried out, these records
can reveal a lot of information. On the other hand, Darkcoin works on a de-
centralized master-code network resulting in almost untraceable transactions
hence oﬀering more anonymity. It seems to be gaining popularity in a short
span of time and Darkcoins, like Litecoins, can be mined (demonstration of
proof of work) using a CPU or GPU [27].
2.3.3 Peercoin
Peercoin [46] which holds the third place in terms of cypto-currency market
share [76], was developed by Sunny King (a pseudonym) and Scott Nadal
and was launched in August 2012. It was the ﬁrst digital currency to use
a combination of proof-of-stake and proof-of-work. Peercoin is also referred
to as PPCoin, Peer-to-Peer Coin, and P2P Coin. The initial generation of
coins is performed with the usual hash based proof-of-work. The diﬃculty
is expected to increase over time and this results in a change from using a
proof-of-work to a proof of stake algorithm to generate new coins. The work
required to generate blocks using the proof of stake algorithm is minimal [38].
As a consequence, the Peercoin network will consume less energy over time.
Peercoin, unlike Bitcoin, is an inﬂationary currency since there is no ﬁxed
upper limit on the number of coins [33].
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2.3.4 Dogecoin
Dogecoin [41] is another currency from the family of crypto-currencies that
was launched in December 2013 and was created by Billy Markus and Jackson
Palmer. Dogecoin is a modiﬁcation of the Bitcoin protocol. Like Litecoin, it
uses scrypt technology as a proof-of-work scheme. It has a block generation
time of 60 seconds and the diﬃculty adjustment time is four hours. It is
inﬂationary in nature similar to Peercoin so that the supply of coins will remain
uncapped. Dogecoin deals with large numbers of lower value coins (individual
coin value) consequently lowering the entry barrier to using the currency and
making it a better ﬁt for carrying out smaller transactions [33].
2.3.5 Primecoin
Primecoin [45] is by far the most distinct in the set of the crypto-currencies
discussed in this section. Developed by Sunny King (who also developed Peer-
coin), its proof-of-work is based on prime numbers, making it distinct from
Hashcash crypto-currencies based on the Bitcoin framework. This proof-of-
work scheme is concerned with ﬁnding Cunningham chains and bi-twin chains.
These are special long chains of prime numbers. Primecoin oﬀers easier mining
and greater security to the network [45].
2.4 Double-spending
Double-spending is when an entity manages to successfully spend the same
money more than once. Where physical cash is concerned, once a dollar has
been spent by its current owner, for example, it is no longer possible for that
owner to spend the same dollar as the owner is no longer in possession of that
dollar [42]. `Traditional' electronic payment systems typically feature a cen-
tralized authority which records and validates all transactions. There are strict
consistency rules applied by the central authority and transactions are recorded
in the exact order in which they occurred. This makes a double-spending at-
tack very diﬃcult if not impossible to carry out. A similar consistency model
exists in centralized virtual currencies such as WebMoney [42], thereby making
them equally immune to double-spending attacks.
However, the same cannot be said of decentralized virtual currencies such as
Bitcoin. By design, these distribute state (of the ledger) across a peer to peer
network. Despite the advantage of increased privacy this brings about, the re-
sulting consistency model is relatively weak consequently making the currency
vulnerable to double-spending attacks. Nakamoto addresses this concern in
the original Bitcoin paper [54] with a simple solution. The solution proposed
is the consensus mechanism of the Bitcoin network. Once a transaction is
conﬁrmed, it is safe. For a transaction to be conﬁrmed, it has to be 6 blocks
deep in the blockchain. However, this can only work for transactions that are
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not in real-time. A window of opportunity to double spend still exists for fast
payments. ETHZ researchers [44] performed an extensive analysis of this prob-
lem. More speciﬁcally, they show that not only can these attacks succeed with
overwhelming probability, but also that, contrary to common belief, they do
not incur any signiﬁcant overhead on the attacker. They propose the propaga-
tion of double-spending alerts in the network and claim this would constitute
a ﬁrst important step towards eﬃciently detecting double-spending.
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Bitcoin
3.1 Introduction
Bitcoin is a P2P (peer to peer) electronic payment system. It is beyond the
scope of this thesis to provide a comprehensive description of Bitcoin, its ar-
chitecture and how it operates, but we endeavor in this chapter to outline the
important aspects. For a more comprehensive treatment of the subject, refer
to [2, 54, 58] and the Bitcoin wiki [49]. We begin by providing the key un-
derlying technical details of Bitcoin (Section 3.1 to 3.3) and later discuss the
overall Bitcoin ecosystem (Section 3.4).
3.1.1 Cryptography
Cryptography is the underlying technology behind Bitcoin hence its classi-
ﬁcation as a crypto-currency. Bitcoin employs cryptography to secure both
transactions and user identities. Suppose Alice wants to send one bitcoin1 to
Bob. How does Bob know the coin belongs to Alice or that it is in fact Alice
that sent the coin (spooﬁng)? How does Bob verify that Alice has not spent
the said coin already (double-spending)? In a centralized currency system, the
central clearing authority can keep track of coin ownership and verify transac-
tions and user identities. However, since Bitcoin is a P2P system and has no
concept of a central clearing agent, Bitcoin employs cryptographic hashes and
digital signatures to address these issues.
3.1.2 The Bitcoin Wallet, Digital Signatures, and
Ownership
Bitcoin uses public-key cryptography. Two cryptographic keys, one public and
one private, are generated and stored in the wallet. At its most basic, a wallet
is a collection of these keys thereby allowing a user to transact bitcoins. The
1Lower case bitcoin refers to the actual currency coin and not the entire system.
16
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. BITCOIN 17
private key is used to sign transactions. Only the owner of the wallet has access
to the private key. Consequently, this provides proof that the transaction
signed with the said private key has been initiated by the owner of the wallet.
It also makes the transaction tamper-proof once it has been issued. Getting
back to our earlier example, public-key cryptography allows Bob to have proof
that it is in fact Alice that sent the bitcoin and also that the transaction has
not been altered by anybody since it was issued by Alice.
Wallets come in diﬀerent forms depending on the type of device in use
[2]. There are software wallets and physical wallets. Examples of physical
wallets are paper wallets and hardware wallets such as trezor [71] and Ledger
Nano [55]. These keep credentials oine while allowing a user to transact
[2]. Software wallets are more popular as they are convenient to use. There
are three kinds of software wallets, desktop wallets, mobile wallets and online
wallets. Common implementations of online wallets are Snapcard [66], Circle
[18], Coinbase [19] and Blockchain.info [14]. Desktop wallets are more numer-
ous such as Bitcoin Core (full node and wallet software) [8] and mSIGNA [17]
which have versions for Windows, Mac, and Linux. Mobile versions include
Copay (available on Android, iOS, and Windows) [21], and Bitcoin Wallet
(available on Android and Blackberry OS) [9].
3.2 The Blockchain
Wallets are often described as a place to hold or store bitcoins. However, due
to the nature of the Bitcoin system, bitcoins cannot be separated from the
blockchain. The blockchain is a data structure that contains an ordered list
of blocks (Section 3.2.2). It is, in essence, the public distributed ledger of the
Bitcoin system. Usually, the blockchain is stored as a ﬂat ﬁle or in a simple
database. Blocks in the blockchain are linked in such a way that each block
refers to the previous block in the chain as shown in Figure 3.2. This rule does
not apply to the ﬁrst block in the chain, the genesis block (Section 3.2.3).
3.2.1 Transactions
A transaction is a transfer of value between Bitcoin wallets or more accurately,
Bitcoin addresses. There are two kinds of transactions in the Bitcoin system,
namely coin base, and regular transactions. Regular transactions take place
when the value is transferred between two Bitcoin addresses. Going back to
the Alice and Bob example, if Alice sends one bitcoin to Bob, that transaction
must have three pieces of information besides other details:
1. An input. This ﬁeld records the Bitcoin address from which Alice re-
ceived the bitcoins in the ﬁrst place (she received them from Eve). Eve
in turn, received her coins from Jack (Jack's address is the input to Eve's
transaction in which Alice's address is the output) who earned them as
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a reward for mining a block. This way, any coin can be traced back to
the coin base transaction that generated it.
2. An amount. This ﬁeld holds the number of bitcoins being transferred
and in this case, one bitcoin that Alice is sending to Bob.
3. An output. This ﬁeld holds the address of the recipient of the value in
the transaction, in this case, Bob's Bitcoin address.
All Bitcoin transactions contain the above three pieces of information except
for the coin base transaction which does not require an input. This is a special
transaction that represents the creation or minting of new coins. Transactions
are broadcast to the network and the conﬁrmation process begins when the
next block is mined (which will contain the veriﬁed transactions).
3.2.2 Blocks
A block is a container data structure that aggregates transactions to be in-
cluded in the blockchain. The block is comprised of a header and body. The
header is 80 bytes in size and contains meta-data while the body contains a
list of one or more transactions. The body makes up the bulk of the block
and is at least 250 bytes in size. The average block contains more than 500
transactions, making it on average 1500 times larger than the header [2].
3.2.2.1 The Block Header
The block meta-data contained in the block header can be divided into three
parts. The ﬁrst item is a reference to the hash of the previous block (parent). A
block connects to the blockchain through its parent, so this data item serves as
a link. The second item is a set that is comprised of the diﬃculty, time-stamp,
and nonce. These items relate to Bitcoin mining as detailed in Section 3.3.
The last part contains the Merkle tree root (Section 3.2.2.3), a data structure
used to eﬃciently and uniquely summarize all the transactions in the block.
3.2.2.2 Block Identiﬁers
A block can be identiﬁed in two ways. The primary identiﬁer is its crypto-
graphic hash (a digital ﬁngerprint) commonly referred to as the block hash.
This is a 32-byte hash made by hashing the block header twice using the
SHA256 algorithm. The block hash identiﬁes a block uniquely and unambigu-
ously and can be independently derived by any node by hashing the block
header.
A block can also be identiﬁed by its position in the blockchain, called the
block height or depth. The calculation of the height or depth of a block starts
from the genesis block which is at depth 0. Each subsequent block added after
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the ﬁrst block is one position deeper in the blockchain. A common analogy
is boxes stacked on top of each other [2].
The block depth is not a unique identiﬁer as compared to the block hash.
A single block will always have a speciﬁc block depth, but the reverse is not
true. The block depth does not always identify a single block since two or
more blocks might have the same block depth when the blockchain forks (see
Section 3.2.4).
3.2.2.3 Merkle Tree
As mentioned in Section 3.2.2.1, each block in the blockchain contains a sum-
mary of all the transactions (Merkle root) in that block summarized using a
Merkle tree.
A Merkle tree [50] named after its creator Ralph Merkle is a data structure
used for eﬃciently summarizing and verifying the integrity of large sets of data.
It is also known as a binary hash tree. Merkle trees are binary trees containing
cryptographic hashes as illustrated in Figure 3.1. In the illustration, the data
Figure 3.1: Example Merkle Hash.
items D0 to D3 are hashed individually, then the resulting hashes are hashed
in pairs repeatedly until the top hash H0123 is computed which is referred to
as the Merkle root. This is how Bitcoin hashes transactions until the Merkle
root hash is computed and stored in the block header.
3.2.2.4 Linking Blocks in the Blockchain
Normally, full nodes (not devices like phones) on the Bitcoin network maintain
a complete local copy of the blockchain2. As new blocks are mined, they are
broadcast to the network. Once a node receives a new block, it updates the
2Starting at the genesis block.
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local copy of the blockchain and extends it accordingly. However, before the
block is added to the blockchain, it is validated. Validation involves verifying
that the block is valid, that transactions included in the block are valid and
that a valid proof of work exists (Section 3.3). Once validation is complete,
the block is linked to its parent by examining the block header and looking for
the previous block hash.
3.2.3 The Genesis Block
The genesis block is the ﬁrst block in the blockchain and it was created in
2009. All blocks in the blockchain can be traced back to the genesis block.
This block cannot be altered as it is encoded within the bitcoin client. This
is the starting point for the blockchain, a secure root from which to build a
trusted blockchain. As [2] puts it,
Every node always knows the genesis block's hash and struc-
ture, the ﬁxed time it was created, and even the single transaction
within.
This means that every node starts with at least a blockchain containing one
block.
3.2.4 Blockchain Dynamics
Each block in the blockchain has a unique identiﬁer, its hash (the hash of the
its header) computed using the SHA256 algorithm. Each block also has a ﬁeld
referred to as the previous block hash within its header. This ﬁeld serves as a
pointer to the previous block, known as the parent block. Since the blockchain
is a tree-like data structure, these pointers link blocks in such a way that a
block points to its parent, which in turn points to its parent creating a chain
going back to the root of the tree, the genesis block.
In the ideal scenario, the blockchain can be represented as a unary tree
with a single branch extending from the genesis block. In this case, each block
has exactly one parent and each parent has exactly one child. However, in
the real Bitcoin network, forks in the blockchain occur occasionally, mostly
due to communication delays in the network [26]. A fork arises when several
blocks are mined almost simultaneously by diﬀerent miners3. With or without
the presence of forks, a block has just one parent. However, a parent may
have multiple children when the blockchain forks. This is because the blocks
mined almost simultaneously all point to one block as the parent. A fork is
shown in the blockchain schematic in Figure 3.2. Forks are resolved using the
longest chain rule. When the next block is mined, it will be mined on either of
3A miner is a node on the network that veriﬁes transactions and is involved in the
consensus mechanism of the Bitcoin system.
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the competing blocks (B4-B or B4-A), making one branch of the fork longer
as shown in Figure 3.2. According to the current Bitcoin speciﬁcation, when
one branch becomes one block longer than the other branch (in this case, the
branch comprising block B4-B and B5), all miners abandon the shorter branch
(B4-A) and begin mining on the longer branch.
Figure 3.2: Visualization of the blockchain with a fork.
Since a block's hash is computed on its header which contains the hash
of the parent block, it follows that a change in the parent's hash or identity
aﬀects the hash of the current block. When the parent is modiﬁed in any
way, the parent's hash changes. The changed hash of the parent necessitates
a change in the previous block hash ﬁeld (pointer) of the child. This causes
the child's hash to change, thereby necessitating a change in the grandchild's
pointer. The resulting required change in grandchild, further necessitates a
change in the great grandchild and so on. The cascading eﬀect caused by
this daisy chain linking of blocks ensures that once a block has many blocks
following it, a change to the block makes the recalculation of all subsequent
blocks necessary. The enormous computation that such a recalculation would
require entails that a long chain of blocks makes the blockchain history for
all practical purposes permanent. It is generally accepted that once a block
is 6 blocks deep in the blockchain, then it is tentatively conﬁrmed. While it
remains true that the possibility of a block being reversed or the chain being
undone by a longer chain exits, the probability of such an event happening
due to the amount of computation that it would require decreases with time
until it becomes negligible. This is a key feature of Bitcoin security.
3.3 Mining
Mining is the process by which transaction records are added to the blockchain.
Bitcoin nodes use the blockchain to verify whether a coin is legitimate and if
it has not been spent already.
It is not accidental that the mining process is resource-intensive. It was
designed this way to regulate the block generation rate in the network. Each
block that is mined is checked to see if it has a valid proof of work. This is the
reason why it is called mining as it resembles the mining of commodities such
as gold (the bitcoin miner exerts eﬀort to compute the proof of work like a
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gold miner exerts eﬀort to mine gold) and the new coins are analogous to the
commodity being mined. In the initial phase of Bitcoin, a miner needed only a
PC to solve the cryptographic puzzle that forms the proof of work. However,
as time went on and more miners appeared, the diﬃculty of the cryptographic
puzzle was increased so that the average time to mine a block remained at its
designed value of 10 minutes and this was met by the introduction of Graphical
Processing Units (GPUs) in the mining process. The diﬃculty was further
increased and consequently miners migrated to using General Programmable
Field Arrays (GPFAs) computers. This necessitated a further increase in the
diﬃculty of the puzzle and in response, miners resorted to using Application
Speciﬁc Integrated Circuit (ASIC) computers to mine.
Bitcoin follows a democratic voting process to decide what version of the
blockchain is considered correct. Mining is the process by which, for all prac-
tical purposes, this secure tamper-resistant consensus is reached. To provide
an incentive to miners to validate transactions and secure the Bitcoin system,
a reward in the form of a ﬁxed amount of bitcoins (currently 25 bitcoins) is
given to the successful miner of a new block. This is how new coins are intro-
duced to the system. Miners also collect transaction fees for each transaction
they validate.
3.3.1 The Mining Process
A summary of the important features of the mining process is shown in the
ﬂowchart in Figure 3.3. The process involves collecting and validating trans-
actions. The valid transactions are hashed and then the miner attempts to
compute a proof of work. This process goes on until either a valid proof of
work is found or the miner receives a new block mined by another node. At
this point, the miner adds the new block to its blockchain and begins to mine
on the new block.
3.3.2 Proof of Work
A proof of work (POW) is a system that requires a service requester to per-
form some minimum required work (usually some computation that requires
processing time by a computer). It is often used to deter attacks and ser-
vice abuses. The concept can be credited to Dwork and Naor [56]. There are
several kinds of POW schemes, but a key feature of them all is their asymme-
try. It is critical for any POW scheme that the work done by the requester
must be moderately hard (costly or time-consuming but feasible) but trivial
to check for the service provider. Bitcoin's proof of work is based on Back's
Hashcash [3]. Its premise is the computation of a cryptographic puzzle that
involves generating a hash of the block header to meet speciﬁed diﬃculty re-
quirements. The computation of the crypto-puzzle is a random process with
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Figure 3.3: Mining Process Flowchart.
a low probability of success. Consequently, to generate a valid POW requires
a substantial amount of trial and error.
Consider a miner M . To compute the proof of work, M attempts to com-
pute a double-SHA256 hash H of a block header such that the number X of
leading zeros in H is
X ≥ T (3.1)
where T is the target diﬃculty (number of leading zeros). The value of T is
adjusted from time to time to make the computation more diﬃcult or easier
to ensure that a block is mined every 10 minutes on average. H is computed
as below
H =M(ni, Bh, Hi−1) (3.2)
where Hi−1 is the double-SHA256 hash of the parent block, Bh is the Merkle
root (Section 3.2.2.3) of all transactions in the current block and ni is the
nonce.
All three values Bh, ni and Hi−1 are concatenated to form a string that is
used during the computation. The node computes H with nonce ni = 0. If
X does not have the required number of leading zeros, ni := ni + 1 and H is
recomputed. This is repeated until X satisﬁes equation (3.1).
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If all possible nonce values have been exhausted and a POW that meets
the minimum diﬃculty requirement has not been found, changes are made to
the coin-base ﬁeld (coinbase) in the coin base transaction. This changes the
current block header and in turn, the Merkle tree is recomputed which results
in a diﬀerent Merkle root Bh. In this way, the coin-base ﬁeld serves as a second
source of randomization for the POW computation [2].
3.4 The Bitcoin Ecosystem
Having laid the technical foundation for Bitcoin in the previous sections, we
can now focus our attention on the Bitcoin ecosystem. The Bitcoin ecosys-
tem goes beyond the technology that enables the distributed validation and
processing of transactions. It is a complex Econo-Sociotechnical system [24]
that is comprised of the core Bitcoin network and intermediary entities such
as payment processors and wallet ﬁrms. An analysis of the Bitcoin ecosystem
based on systems theory is given in [24].
Bitcoin has received a substantial amount of media attention, both positive
and negative. However, the majority of the negative media reports have had
more to do with intermediary systems built on top of Bitcoin than the underly-
ing Bitcoin protocol itself. Intermediaries of note in the Bitcoin ecosystem are
payment processors, digital currency exchanges, and wallet ﬁrms. These have
been mostly successful. A good example is BitPay [11] which has relationships
with more than 60,000 merchants since its founding in 2011 making it the
largest Bitcoin payment processor. However, despite these successes, failures
like that of Mt.Gox, the largest exchange and wallet service, have raised issues
about the unregulated nature of the system besides the resulting negative me-
dia reports and perception. About 470 million US dollars worth of bitcoins at
the time were lost from customer accounts held at Mt.Gox when it collapsed
[69] in February 2014. Since this failure, it is clear that a paradox exists for the
Bitcoin community since the original idea of Bitcoin was to avoid the introduc-
tion of regulation, but such incidents demand a closer regulatory framework
to secure bitcoins and restore conﬁdence in the overall Bitcoin economy.
Finally, the debate as to whether bitcoins should be considered currency
or commodity continues and it remains unclear with which perspective the
average consumer and the monetary authorities will eventually view bitcoins.
3.4.1 Acquiring Bitcoins
Like any new technology, Bitcoin is not yet widely accepted in the business
community, but numerous merchants now accept bitcoins as payment for goods
or services although the means and ways to use bitcoins to pay for services is
still an active area of research and development. It may soon be possible to
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use bitcoins on PayPal [61] to make purchases. However, before one can use
bitcoins, the bitcoins must be acquired. Bitcoins can be obtained by,
 buying them from an exchange,
 getting them from an individual who has bitcoins or
 receiving a reward in bitcoins for successfully mining a block.
In the case where an individual intends to buy bitcoins, there are several digital
currency exchanges worldwide that trade in bitcoins. Some of the popular ones
are Bitstamp, Bitﬁnex, Coinbase, Cryptsy, BTC-e, Kraken, and BTCChina.
The majority of bitcoin exchange transactions is done in US dollars.
3.4.2 Scalability
Scalability is an important concern in any system. Considering the volumes
of transactions processed by current electronic payment systems such as Visa
(record of about 2000 TPS), can Bitcoin scale to accommodate such volumes
of transactions? This is a critical concern for the following reasons.
 The size of the block is currently limited to 1MB. The average size of
a Bitcoin transaction is 250 bytes. This means at most an average of
4194 transactions can be incorporated into each block. Since a block is
mined every 600 seconds on average, it means with the current block
size, Bitcoin transaction rate is capped at about 4194/600 ≈ 7 TPS.
 All full nodes keep a copy of the entire blockchain which is currently
about 20GB in size and grows by one block every 10 minutes on average.
Increasing the size of the block to accommodate more transaction results
in an increase in the rate at which the size of the blockchain increases.
Consequently, the power (storage4 and processing) of full nodes will have
to be increased. This raises the cost of having full nodes, which in
turn, has a centralizing eﬀect as less powerful nodes will eventually leave
the network. Increasing the block size limit has long been an issue of
contention in the Bitcoin community. Recently, as reported in the 22nd
August 2015 edition of The Economist [70], two of the main developers
of Bitcoin have released a competing version of the Bitcoin core software
that increases the block size limit. The new software is called Bitcoin
XT and it is envisioned that once 75% of the miners migrate to Bitcoin
XT, there will be an upgrade to increase the block size limit to 8MB,
which will be doubled every two years.
4In order to allow for 2 transactions per day for every individual alive, each block would
need to be about 24GB in size [49].
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 Transactions in a block are only considered conﬁrmed (tentatively) when
the block is 6 blocks deep into the blockchain. This means a transaction
will only be conﬁrmed on average after an hour.
The above limitations warrant serious concern should Bitcoin be widely ac-
cepted for use. For example, if a customer is making a purchase online using
bitcoins, do they have to wait for an hour before the purchase is conﬁrmed?
A number of solutions have been proposed for the above issues such using
the Lightning Network, which allows trust-less oﬀ-chain transactions. For a
thorough treatment of the subject, refer to the Bitcoin wiki [49].
3.4.3 A Comparison of Bitcoin and Other Payment
Systems
Bitcoin is an electronic payment system [54]. An overview of electronic pay-
ment systems is given in Chapter 2. In this section, we compare Bitcoin to
other payment systems, speciﬁcally Visa [72], Paypal [60] and M-Pesa [64]. We
begin by brieﬂy explaining how the other payment systems work.
3.4.3.1 Visa
There are 5 key entities that enable typical Visa [72] transactions to take place.
 Cardholder : A customer that has been issued with a Visa-branded card.
 Merchant : an entity that accepts Visa payments. A typical merchant
would be a store such as a supermarket or a service provider such as an
airline.
 Issuer : The issuer is the ﬁnancial institution that issues the card to the
cardholder.
 Acquirer : This is the ﬁnancial institution that provides ﬁnancial services
to the merchant in question for purposes of processing the merchant's
payments.
 VisaNet : The network that provides fast, reliable and secure connections
for the ﬁnancial institutions (Issuers and Acquirers) to exchange ﬁnancial
information.
The customer (card holder) initiates a transaction from a merchant site, an
ATM (overseas ATM) or a pay point in a store. Details of the customer are
captured from the card. If the customer uses an ATM or pay point, the details
are read from the card's chip or magnetic strip and the customer's personal
identiﬁcation number (PIN) is requested for authentication. If a transaction
is initiated online, the user enters the card details which include the 16 digit
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primary account number (PAN), expiry date and sometimes the 3 digit secu-
rity code. Once the required customer details are captured, an authorization
request is created. This is a message that contains the customer details, trans-
action details, and merchant identiﬁcation number. The authorization request
is then forwarded to the acquirer. The acquirer records the transaction and
forwards the request to the appropriate network identiﬁed by the ﬁrst few dig-
its of the PAN, in this case, VisaNet. VisaNet records the request and forwards
it to the issuer identiﬁed by the bank identiﬁcation number (BIN) which is a
part of the PAN. VisaNet can process more than 56000 TPS (transactions per
second) [72], the average being 2000 TPS and a daily peak of about 4000 TPS.
The issuer receives and records the request. The issuer must either decline or
authorize the request. To achieve this, a number of checks are done, but at
a minimum and depending on the type of card (credit, debit or prepaid), the
issuer veriﬁes that the cardholder has enough credit to cover the transaction.
If so, the request is authorized and recorded in the ledger. The request is
forwarded back through the same channel and each entity on the return path
records the status. If the request was authorized, the transaction is ﬁnalized
when the acquirer pays the merchant or pays the card holder in case it is a
cash withdrawal otherwise an error is returned to the cardholder holder. This
process completes normally within seconds. The issuer debits the customer's
account and reimburses the acquirer the amount paid to the merchant on be-
half of its customer. The merchant's account is credited after a delay of several
days.
3.4.3.2 PayPal
PayPal [60] is a person to person payment system (Chapter 2 Section 2.2.4).
PayPal allows registered users to pay for goods or services online from regis-
tered merchants and to send money. Cash transactions such as withdrawals
are not supported. There are three kinds of PayPal accounts.
 Personal : A personal account is used by individuals who want to make
online payments. There are no opening fees for this type of account.
 Premier : This is used by individuals who want to sell things online.
It allows for the transfer of funds from the PayPal account into the
individual's bank account.
 Business or Merchant : This is used by merchants such as e-bay.
The advantage of PayPal is that it charges a low fee for any transaction for all
account types as compared to Visa. A PayPal account can be linked to either
a bank account, debit/credit card or prepaid account. PayPal acts as the mid-
dle man to transfer payments between the buyer (personal account) and seller
(merchant). Consequently, the back-end process when processing a payment
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request will diﬀer depending on the mechanism, e.g. ACH (Automated Clear-
ing House). The personal account holder normally initiates a payment request
by selecting pay with PayPal on the merchant site. This directs the user to the
PayPal site where user details are entered. Once user veriﬁcation is done, Pay-
Pal performs a number of checks depending on the payment mechanism such
as account status checks if using ACH. Once the necessary checks are done,
PayPal generates a payment token that is forwarded to the merchant's site
for approval. Upon merchant conﬁrmation, PayPal records and transmits an
appropriate transaction type, e.g. a debit order to the personal account holder
if using ACH. The merchant's account is then credited with the transaction
amount. This process, like Visa, is also completed in a matter of seconds.
Transactions fees are often posted later to the merchant's account.
3.4.3.3 M-Pesa
M-Pesa5 is a mobile payment system (Chapter 2 Section 2.2.3). It was launched
in 2007 for Safaricom in Kenya and Vodacom in South Africa. It has since
been implemented in other countries [64]. For any transaction to take place,
there are normally three parties involved.
 End User : A customer with a mobile phone registered with the service
provider. The end user has an account attached to the mobile phone
number.
 Mobile Services provider : The mobile telecommunication company, in
this case, Vodacom or any other provider that has deployed M-Pesa.
 Merchant : An entity that accepts mobile payments that is registered
with the service provider.
Typically, M-Pesa allows an end user to perform transactions such as money
transfers, cash deposits, cash withdraws, bill payments and to make purchases
from a merchant using funds from the account attached to their mobile number.
For this reason, the service provider needs a separate banking license (sepa-
rate from the telecommunications license) with its accompanying regulations
to operate such a service. The service can be accessed using USSD6, a mobile
phone application or STK (SIM Tool Kit) menu. It is from this interface that
the end user initiates a transaction. However, money must be deposited into
the account attached to the mobile number at any authorized agent before
the `mobile money' can be used. When the end user initiates a transaction
from the mobile phone, the transaction is received and processed by the mo-
bile service provider typically the same way transactions are processed at a
5M representing mobile and pesa is a Swahili word which means money
6Unstructured Supplementary Services Data (USSD) is a protocol used in GSM net-
works, for example, when a user dials ∗111#
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traditional bank. When the service provider veriﬁes that the user has enough
credit in their account to oﬀset the transaction amount, the transaction is au-
thorized. The merchant's account (or a recipient end user's account in case of
money transfer between end users) is credited with the transaction amount,
and the initiating end user's account is debited with the transaction amount
plus service fees. The merchant or recipient end user receives notiﬁcation of
payment and the initiating end user is informed of the transaction's status,
success or failure. The process typically completes within seconds.
3.4.3.4 Bitcoin
Typically, a Bitcoin transaction involves three entities.
 End User : The customer who wants to pay for goods or services with
bitcoins.
 Bitcoin Wallet Software: The software that stores the user's bitcoins
and the private key used to sign transactions. Wallets are discussed in
Section 3.1.2.
 Bitcoin Core Network : The core P2P network of miners maintaining the
blockchain.
 Merchant : An entity that accepts bitcoins as payment for goods or ser-
vices.
Since there are varying implementations of how payments using bitcoins are
done such as BitPay [11], BitPesa [12] and PayFast [59], we use PayFast for
illustrative purposes. An end user will initiate a transaction from a merchant
site by clicking the pay with bitcoin option. This redirects the customer
to the PayFast site which generates the QR code that the customer can scan
with their mobile Bitcoin client. The QR code will have the amount of the
purchase in bitcoins at the current exchange rate as provided by BitX [13] and
the merchant wallet address. For other kinds of wallet implementations, the
amount in bitcoins and the merchant's wallet address are also displayed on
the PayFast site. The user then sends the funds to the merchant by signing
the transaction with their private key and the transaction is broadcast to the
Bitcoin core network. Eventually, PayFast receives conﬁrmation from BitX
that the funds have been received. The user then gets a success notiﬁcation
and is then redirected back to the merchant site. After this, Payfast will
notify the merchant that the payment has been received. The transaction is
then considered complete. Depending on the amount involved, some merchants
may opt to wait until the transaction is conﬁrmed by the Bitcoin core network.
This entails that the transaction will not be ﬁnalized until after an hour. Table
3.1 gives a summary of some diﬀerences between Bitcoin, M-Pesa, PayPal, and
Visa.
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Table 3.1: A Comparison of Bitcoin and other Payment Systems.
System Pay Points Online Cash Withdraw Send Money Cost
Visa Yes Yes Yes No High
PayPal No Yes No Yes Medium
M-Pesa Yes No Yes Yes Low
Bitcoin Possibly a Yes Possibly a Yes Low
a Possibly means there may be no current implementations of such
a facility but it is theoretically possible.
Bitcoin works like any other payment system with the advantage of low
cost. However, the biggest problem remains the scalability issues mentioned
in Section 3.4.2.
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Simulation of the Bitcoin Protocol
4.1 The Simulator
Modelling and simulation are important and generally accepted as ways to rep-
resent and explore the behaviour of diverse physical and non-physical systems.
In order to gain insight into the dynamics of the Bitcoin blockchain, we devel-
oped a discrete event simulator in C++. The simulator models the important
aspects of the Bitcoin P2P overlay network, mining and block transmission.
The rules described in the following section summarize the signiﬁcant aspects of
our simulation model but are by no means exhaustive. We assume at this stage
that only honest miners who follow the prescribed Bitcoin rules are present in
the network and that all communication is subject to communication delays.
4.1.1 The Simulation Model
Our simulation model implements a subset of the protocol rules as described in
the protocol speciﬁcation presented in the Bitcoin wiki [49]. Our model does
not include generation and transmission of transactions as these details are
not relevant to our investigation. Consequently, all the rules on transactions
have been omitted and we assume that transactions are valid and veriﬁed
before they are added to a block. A summary of the simpliﬁed set of rules
implemented in the simulator is presented in Appendix A. Based on this, our
Bitcoin model works as follows.
 Blocks are mined at the instants of a Poisson process. One block is mined
every 10 minutes on average.
 A total of 10,000 blocks are mined. This includes the blocks that are
deleted due to forks.
 All nodes have uniform hashing power and have the same probability of
being chosen to mine a block.
31
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 Nodes are located at random on an (x, y) plane
 The network communication delay t seconds is a random variable sam-
pled from a normal distribution whose mean is proportional to the Eu-
clidean distance between the two nodes communicating and with a con-
stant coeﬃcient of variation (CV ). Unless otherwise stated, CV = 0.1
in all our experiments.
 When a node (miner) mines a block, the block is ﬁrst added to its local
blockchain, then it is broadcast to all the peers in the network subject
to a communication delay t. In the real Bitcoin system, only the header
is sent and a node requests the block data if it does not already have the
block.
 When a node receives a block, there are two possible scenarios.
1. The block has a valid solution and its parent is in the blockchain.
The block is appended to its parent.
2. The block has a valid solution, but its parent is not in the blockchain.
The block is added to the block pool 1 and its parent requested.
 The block pool is checked to see if there are orphaned blocks whose parent
pointer points to a block in the blockchain. Such blocks are removed from
the block pool and added to the blockchain.
 A received block that is already in either the blockchain or block pool is
considered a duplicate and deleted. Duplicate blocks are possible because
a block can arrive at a node before its parent (which is still in transit).
When this happens, the parent is requested causing the same block to
be sent to one node more than once.
 A k-nary tree is used to represent the blockchain [62].
4.2 Simulation Results
Based on the model above, we simulated a network of 1000 nodes (miners).
Multiple replications of the simulation were executed with diﬀerent random
number seeds. In our case, 12 replications were run for each simulation and
95% conﬁdence intervals were computed. The results are presented in Figures
4.1 to 4.3.
1The block pool is the container that stores the blocks that temporarily cannot be
appended to the miner's blockchain.
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Figure 4.1: Blockchain splits per day as a function of the communication delay.
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Figure 4.2: The ratio r(t) as a function of the communication delay.
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Figure 4.3: The dwell time td as a function of the communication delay.
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Figure 4.1 shows a plot of the number of splits per day as a function of the
communication delay in seconds. Both the x and y-axis are logarithmic.
Figure 4.2 shows the ratio r(t) of the number of blocks mined to the number
of splits as a function of the communication delay t.
Figure 4.3 shows a plot of the dwell time (td) as a function of the commu-
nication delay. The Bitcoin protocol works in such a way that the blockchains
at each node in the network are usually identical, having a single leaf. How-
ever when communications delays are present, diﬀerences in the blockchains
at nodes can be observed. These diﬀerences are resolved with time. Consider
a time T when the blockchains at all the nodes are identical. Blocks are mined
and added, further extending the blockchain. The blockchains may now dif-
fer at the nodes. Let T ′ such that T ′ > T denote the next time when all
blockchains are synchronized again. The dwell time td is deﬁned as
td = T
′ − T. (4.1)
4.3 Discussion
From Figure 4.1, we can see that the relationship between the number of
splits and the communication delay is linear. When communication delays are
absent, the blockchain never splits since blocks are received instantaneously
the moment they are transmitted2. However, this deviates from reality since all
real networks have latency. Decker and Wattenhofer [26] show that the average
block propagation delay in the Bitcoin network is 12.6 seconds. Usually, splits
occur when two blocks are mined at almost the same time. Due to block
propagation delays, the nodes are not instantly aware of a block that may have
been mined hence they continue to mine on top of the last block received. The
larger the delay, the longer it takes for the entire network to be aware of any
new block(s). Conversely, the smaller the delay, the quicker the blockchains
at individual nodes get synchronized resulting in each node quickly having a
correct and complete view of the blockchain. As a result, each node is almost
always mining on the correct block of the blockchain (longest chain) resulting
in fewer splits. This is the reason for the observed linear relationship between
the number of splits and communication delay.
The dwell time is a measure of how quickly a block propagates through
the network. From Figure 4.3, we can see that the average dwell time td ∼ kt
where k is a constant and t is the average communication delay. We can also
see that when t ≈ 12, the maximum dwell time is about 45 seconds. This
agrees with Decker and Wattenhofer's [26] ﬁndings that even after 40 seconds,
some nodes in the Bitcoin network will not have received the new block.
2In our simulation model, blocks are mined at instants of a Poison process, making it
impossible for more than one block to be mined at the same instant. However, in the real
Bitcoin network, it is possible that more than one miner can mine a block at the same
instant making splits possible even when there are no communication delays.
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In addition, our results agree with Decker and Wattenhofer's [26], who
observe a 1.69% fork rate in the observed 10,000 block interval with an average
block propagation delay of 12.6 seconds. Our simulation results show that
when 10,000 blocks are mined and the average communication delay is 10
seconds, an average of 2.4 splits per 24 hours is observed. Since an average
of 144 blocks are mined per 24 hours, our percentage fork rate is calculated
as, (2.4/144) ∗ 100 = 1.67%. This is close to Decker and Wattenhofer's value
of 1.69% and conﬁrms that for the network model under investigation, our
simulator accurately models the Bitcoin blockchain.
We therefore conclude that, when all nodes in the network are honest and
communication delays are present, the Bitcoin protocol is robust and can re-
solve the splits and diﬀerences that occur on the individual blockchains so that
a consistent view of the blockchain is observed across the network.
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Selﬁsh-Mine
5.1 Introduction
Selﬁsh-mine is one of several strategies that have been developed to subvert
the Bitcoin protocol [4]. According to [32], Bitcoin mining is not incentive-
compatible1 and this can lead to the emergence of mining pools that follow
the selﬁsh-mine strategy to gain advantage and earn revenue in excess of their
fair share. Key to the operation of the selﬁsh-mine strategy is the selective
and opportunistic revelation of blocks discovered or mined by members of the
pool. This causes the honest nodes to waste their resources mining blocks
that are destined not to be in the main chain. The main chain is the branch of
the blockchain consisting a chain of blocks (linked by pointers to the previous
block) with the largest sum of work done in expectation, beginning at the
genesis block.
To specify the selﬁsh-mine strategy, we assume that the miners are divided
into two groups [32], the honest nodes following the Bitcoin rules and a mi-
nority of dishonest nodes following the selﬁsh-mine strategy2. We refer to the
fraction of the total computing power commanded by the selﬁsh pool as alpha
(α). The detailed operation of the selﬁsh-mine strategy is shown in Algorithm
1 and the state transition diagram in Figure 5.4.
Initially, the selﬁsh pool has not discovered any blocks, so the dishonest
nodes in the pool mine on the last public block received (block with the serial
number np). The serial number of a block is synonymous with its position
(depth) in the blockchain. This is shown in lines 2 to 5 of Algorithm 1 and
1In mechanism design, a process is incentive-compatible (IC) if the honest revelation
by participants of any private information requested by the mechanism results in the par-
ticipants faring best [74]. Any system in which participants can beneﬁt from dishonest
behaviour lacks the property of IC.
2There is no incentive to stop multiple selﬁsh pools from emerging as can be seen in the
real Bitcoin network which shows the presence of multiple mining pools [23]. We later show
that the presence of multiple pools following the selﬁsh-mine strategy causes the strategy
to be less proﬁtable.
36
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step (0) in the state machine (SM). However, when a dishonest node mines a
block (SM step (1)), the block is only announced to other dishonest nodes in
the selﬁsh pool. At this stage, the honest nodes continue to mine on the older
public block np while the dishonest nodes mine on the newer secret block with
serial number ns = np + 1. We refer to the segment of the blockchain at the
dishonest nodes comprising of the secret block(s) ns as the secret extension.
As long as the selﬁsh pool has not learned3 of any competing public block
(block at the same depth of the blockchain as ns), the pool assumes a lead of
one block and continues to mine on the secret block ns hoping to achieve a
lead of two of more blocks. This is presented in lines 8 to 14 of Algorithm 1.
However, since the pool is in the minority, the honest nodes will catch up.
When an honest node mines a block, it immediately broadcasts it to all
the nodes in the network. When the block is received by the pool 4, the pool
computes the lead and a course of action is selected based on the value of the
lead. The lead refers to how long the secret branch is compared to the public
branch of the blockchain. The secret branch comprises the secret extension
and the parent public branch (the chain of blocks beginning at the predecessor
to the ﬁrst secret block all the way to the genesis block). This is presented in
lines 17 to 36 of Algorithm 1. If the last public block known to the selﬁsh pool
has serial number np and latest secret block ns, then
lead = ns − np. (5.1)
If lead < 0, it means that the secret branch has fallen behind the public
branch. The selﬁsh pool could continue mining on the last block ns of the
secret extension, but the probability of catching up with the majority of honest
nodes is negligible, so the selﬁsh pool abandons the secret extension and starts
mining on the last known public block np.
If lead = 0, it means that the secret branch and the public branch are of
equal length. The selﬁsh pool immediately publishes (making a secret block
public by broadcasting it to all the honest nodes) the only secret block in
the extension causing the blockchain to fork (after a transmission delay) at
all the honest nodes and a race to begin as to which branch will form the
main chain. This is presented in lines 24 to 28 of Algorithm 1 and step (8)
of the SM. Depending on the network topology and propagation delays, one
of the two competing blocks arrives ﬁrst at an honest node in the network.
Since the honest nodes follow the Bitcoin protocol rules, they will mine on
the block they ﬁrst received whether it is a public block or a published block.
Consequently, some honest nodes will begin mining on the recently published
3In a network model characterized by block propagation delays such as investigated in
this thesis, a competing block may have been discovered but delayed in reaching the selﬁsh
pool.
4The selﬁsh-mine algorithm may be executed only at a single controller (gatekeeper) or
by every dishonest node. In this sense, the term pool is used to refer generally to both cases,
centralized and distributed execution of the selﬁsh-mine strategy.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. SELFISH-MINE 38
block hence extending the formerly secret branch. We refer to the fraction of
honest nodes that mine on the published block as γ, which is the measure of
how often a published block arrives ﬁrst at an honest node when there is a
race. An analysis of the eﬀect of block propagation delays on γ using a three
node network conﬁguration is presented in Appendix B. Further discussion on
γ can be found in [34, 35]. At the same time, nodes in the selﬁsh pool continue
mining on the published block. Eventually, a new block is mined that extends
either the public branch or the formerly secret branch. There are three possible
outcomes.
1. The selﬁsh pool mines a successor block to the published block ns. This
is shown in Figure 5.1b and step (9) of the SM. In this case, the pool
wins the race and receives the reward for both blocks. Both the honest
and dishonest nodes begin to mine on the winning block.
2. An honest node mines a successor block to the published block ns. This
is shown in Figure 5.1c and step (10) of the SM. In this case, the pool
still wins the race but is only credited for one block, the predecessor to
the winning block. Both the honest and dishonest nodes begin to mine
on the winning block.
3. An honest node mines a successor block to the competing public block
np. This is shown in Figure 5.1d and step (10) of the SM. In this case,
the pool loses the race and the revenue for block ns while the honest
nodes are credited for both public blocks. The pool abandons the secret
extension and both the honest and dishonest nodes begin to mine on the
winning block.
If lead = 1, it means the secret branch is one block longer than the public
branch. To ensure that the secret blocks end up being part of the main chain,
the pool publishes both secret blocks in the secret extension as shown in Figure
5.2b. Both blocks reach the honest nodes and the honest nodes abandon
mining on the block they were mining on. This is presented in lines 29 to 32
of Algorithm 1 and step (7) of the SM.
If lead > 1, the pool has a comfortable lead over the honest nodes. The
pool publishes the ﬁrst unpublished block in the extension as shown in Figure
5.3b. This is presented in lines 29 to 32 of Algorithm 1 and step (5) of the
SM. Step (4) of the SM represents the case where the pool mines a block when
lead > 1.
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(a) Legend.
(b) Outcome 1: the selﬁsh pool wins the race.
(c) Outcome 2: the revenue is shared.
(d) Outcome 3: an honest miner wins the race.
Figure 5.1: Possible outcomes of a race at a dishonest node.
(a) Legend.
(b) Lead reduced to 1, both secret blocks are published.
Figure 5.2: Both secret blocks are published at a dishonest node following the
announcement of a public block.
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Algorithm 1 The selﬁsh-mine algorithm.
1: procedure Initialize
2: blockchain← publicly known blocks
3: secretExtension←empty
4: race← FALSE
5: mine on the last block of the blockchain np
6: end procedure
7: procedure SecretMine(block)
8: append block to secretExtension
9: if race =TRUE then
10: publish block
11: race←FALSE
12: secretExtension←empty
13: end if
14: mine on block
15: end procedure
16: procedure HonestMine(block)
17: append block to blockchain
18: np ← np + 1 . the last public block has serial np
19: lead← ns − np . the last block on secretExtension has serial ns
20: if lead < 0 then
21: race←FALSE
22: secretExtension←empty
23: mine on block np
24: else if lead = 0 then
25: race←TRUE
26: publish the only block ns in the secretExtension
27: secretExtension←empty
28: mine on block ns
29: else if lead = 1 then
30: publish all two blocks in the secretExtension
31: secretExtension←empty
32: mine on block ns
33: else
34: publish the ﬁrst unpublished block in the secretExtension
35: mine on block ns
36: end if
37: end procedure
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(a) Legend.
(b) Tit for tat publishing.
Figure 5.3: The ﬁrst secret block is published following the announcement of
a public block.
(1) pool mines block / block
appended to secretExt
(2) pool mines block / block
appended to secretExt
do / mine of the last block of the blockchain
secretExt = 0 && race= FALSE
(3) pool mines block / block
appended to secretExt
(5) honest nodes mine block / block appended to chain /
compute lead and publish the first unpublished secret
block [secretExt >= 3]
do / mine of the last block of the secret extension
secretExt = 1 && race= FALSE
(4) pool mines block / block
appended to secretExt
(6) honest nodes mine block / block appended to chain /
compute lead and publish the first unpublished secret
block [secretExt == 2]
do / mine of the last block of the secret extension
secretExt = 2 && race= FALSE
(8) honest nodes mine
block / block appended
to chain / compute lead
and publish the only
unpublished secret
block, race =TRUE
(9) pool mines block /
block appended to
formerly secretExt,
publish block, race =
FALSE
do / mine of the last block of the secret extension
secretExt >= 3 && race= FALSE
(10) honest nodes mine block / block
appended to chain, race = FALSE
do / mine of the last block of the blockchain
secretExt = 0 && race= TRUE
(7) honest nodes mine block / block
appended to chain / compute lead and
publish the 2 unpublished secret blocks
(0) chain = publicly know blocks,
SecretExt = empty, race = FALSE
Powered ByVisual Paradigm Community Edition
Figure 5.4: The selﬁsh-mine state machine.
5.2 Evaluating the Selﬁsh-Mine Strategy
5.2.1 Evaluation Criteria
In order to evaluate the proﬁtability of the selﬁsh-mine strategy, we consider
two approaches, mining eﬃciency, and relative revenue.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. SELFISH-MINE 42
5.2.1.1 Mining Eﬃciency
We consider the mining eﬃciency to be a relative measure of how well oﬀ a
group of dishonest miners is doing as compared to the honest miners. Let N ′p
denote the total number of blocks mined by the honest nodes and let Np ≤ N ′p
denote the total number of blocks mined by the honest nodes that end up in
the main chain. The honest miners without doubt have received the revenue
due for mining Np blocks. Similarly, let N
′
s denote the total number of blocks
mined by the selﬁsh pool and Ns ≤ N ′s denote the total number of blocks
mined by the selﬁsh pool that end up in the main chain. The dishonest miners
without doubt have received the revenue due for mining Ns blocks. We deﬁne
the public mining eﬃciency (Pp) as
Pp = Np/N
′
p, (5.2)
and pool mining eﬃciency (Ps)
Ps = Ns/N
′
s. (5.3)
These equations express the outcome of blocks credited per eﬀort (blocks
mined) for the honest and dishonest nodes respectively. We now deﬁne the
mining eﬃciency D as
D = Ps/Pp. (5.4)
From this deﬁnition, the selﬁsh pool is performing better than the honest
nodes if D > 1. At this point, the pool's utility (reward per eﬀort) is higher
than that of the honest nodes since the pool is losing fewer blocks per block
mined by the pool.
5.2.1.2 Relative Revenue
Eyal and Sirer [32] use the relative revenue to measure how proﬁtable the
selﬁsh-mine strategy is. Let Ns and Np denote the total number of blocks
mined by the selﬁsh pool and the honest nodes respectively that end up in the
main chain at the end of a mining period. The relative revenue is the fraction
of blocks mined by a group of miners (either selﬁsh or honest) that end up in
the main chain during that mining period. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne the relative
pool revenue Rp as
Rp = Ns/(Ns +Np), (5.5)
and relative honest revenue Ro as
Ro = 1−Rp. (5.6)
Selﬁsh mining is proﬁtable if Rp > α where α is the fraction of the total
computational power of the network that is owned by the selﬁsh pool. The
fraction α is representative of the pool's fair share [32] of the mining revenue.
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5.2.2 Simulations and Results
We performed simulation experiments based on the model presented in Chap-
ter 4 Section 4.1.1, but with a network of 40 nodes. Once again 12 replica-
tions were executed for each experiment and 95% conﬁdence intervals were
computed. A subset of the miners commanding 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.5 of the total
computing power of the network follows the selﬁsh-mine strategy. We focused
our investigation on the following key aspects of the selﬁsh-mine strategy as
presented in [32].
1. Using a network model that takes block propagation delays into account.
We make a comparison between the performance of the pool when there
is instantaneous communication (Eyal and Sirer's model [32]) and when
all communication is subject to delays. Throughout this thesis, unless
otherwise stated, our network model is characterized by a 10 seconds
average communication delay5.
2. The threshold at which it becomes proﬁtable, in terms of the relative
revenue and/or mining eﬃciency, for the pool to engage in selﬁsh mining
under the conditions in 1 above. [32] claims that an arbitrarily small
pool of colluding miners can subvert the protocol.
3. The presence of multiple pools following the selﬁsh-mine strategy. Though
out this thesis, except in Section 5.2.2.4, we assume the presence of a
single selﬁsh pool in all our experiments.
In all cases, our evaluation of the performance of the pool(s) is based on
mining eﬃciency and relative revenue.
5.2.2.1 Selﬁsh Mining Under Communication Delays
The network model used to evaluate the selﬁsh-mine strategy as presented in
[32] does not take block propagation delays into account. Our network model,
on the other hand, does not assume instantaneous communication. In this
section, we make a comparison of the performance of the pool using the two
network models. In order to examine the eﬀect of block propagation delays
on the performance of the pool, we ran several simulation experiments while
varying the average communication delay in the network t, 0 ≤ t ≤ 20 seconds.
The results are summarized in Figures 5.5 and 5.6.
Figure 5.5 shows the relative pool revenue Rp for t ∈ {0, 1, 10, 20} sec-
onds. Figure 5.6 is a pseudo 3D plot of the mining eﬃciency obtained from
simulation experiments. The data in Figure 5.6 should be read with the key
on the side representing the color codes for the diﬀerent values of the mining
5In a real network, the block transmission delay is a function of the block size and latency
on the link. However, for our simplistic network model, the block transmission delay and
the communication delay are synonymous and used interchangeably.
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Figure 5.5: The relative revenue in a network with an average communication
delay t, t ∈ {0, 1, 10, 20} seconds.
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Figure 5.6: Mining eﬃciency in a network with an average communication
delay t, 0 ≤ t ≤ 20 seconds.
eﬃciency D. In both cases, the dishonest nodes act as a single pool. From
the ﬁgures, we make the following observations.
 When there is instantaneous communication in the network (0 seconds
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delay), the threshold at which selﬁsh mining becomes proﬁtable is lower
than when there are communication delays in the network. Figure 5.6
shows that the selﬁsh-mine strategy is proﬁtable, in terms of the mining
eﬃciency (D > 1), for α ≈ 0.26. Figure 5.5 complements this value by
showing that the proﬁtability threshold for selﬁsh mining, in terms of
the relative pool revenue Rp, is α ≈ 0.22.
 When communication delays are introduced in the network, the threshold
at which selﬁsh mining becomes proﬁtable is higher (α > 0.3) than when
there are no communication delays in the network as shown in Figure 5.5.
From Figure 5.6, when α ≥ 0.33, selﬁsh mining is proﬁtable regardless
of the block transmission delay.
 From Figure 5.5, the data points6 representing the performance of the
pool in a network with an average communication delay of 1, 10, and 20
seconds are almost superimposed on each other. This means that when
there are communication delays in the network, it is immaterial whether
the average delay is 1 or 20 seconds, the performance of the pool, in
terms of the relative pool revenue Rp, is almost identical.
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Figure 5.7: The relative revenue of the pool and the honest nodes in a 40 node
network with an average block transmission delay of 10 seconds.
In addition, the relative revenues of the selﬁsh pool and the honest nodes
for the case where the average block transmission delay was 10 seconds (our
6Throughout this thesis, the lines in the graphs do not represent actual measurements
from simulations. The data points represent experimental measurements. The lines are only
used to improve the readability of the data.
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delay model) were computed and the results are presented in Figure 5.7. From
the graph, we can see that the pool begins to earn more than its fair share
when α > 0.3. The results agree with those computed using mining eﬃciency
as a measure of proﬁtability.
We conclude that in order to proﬁt from selﬁsh mining, at least in terms of
Rp and D, the pool cannot be arbitrarily small. This is expected since selﬁsh
mining is a gamble and the probability of a small pool winning races and/or
extending the secret extension to be signiﬁcantly long, is small (see Section
5.2.2.2). We showed in [34] that for small pools (α < 0.3), the honest nodes
win the majority of the races. In addition, Eyal and Sirer [32] manipulate γ
as wished, making it possible even for small pools to win all races when γ = 1.
In our model, γ is an observation unless otherwise stated, as is the case in
Section 5.2.3.3. Our results in Figure 5.7 agree with those of Eyal and Sirer
[32] for γ = 0.5. We further showed in [34] that in a large network, for the
case where the selﬁsh pool is managed by a single node, the gatekeeper (see
Section 5.2.2.3), γ is low and γ << 1.
5.2.2.2 The Length of the Secret Extension
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 show the length of the secret extension for α ∈ {0.4, 0.5}
and α ∈ {0.475, 0.5} respectively in a network with an average communication
delay of 10 seconds. While the rest of the experimental results are based on a
70 day mining period, the two ﬁgures show the length of the secret extension
at every mining event for the ﬁrst the 35 days of simulated mining.
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Figure 5.8: The length of the secret extension in a network with an average
block transmission delay of 10 seconds for α ∈ {0.4, 0.5}.
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Figure 5.9: The length of the secret extension in a network with an average
block transmission delay of 10 seconds for α ∈ {0.475, 0.5}.
We make the following remarks about the growth of the secret extension.
 When α ≤ 0.4, the number of blocks in the secret extension is almost
always less than 10 blocks as shown by the lower line in Figure 5.8.
 The probability of the selﬁsh pool building a large secret extension is
directly proportional to the size of the pool. As the pool increases in
size, commanding a greater fraction of the total computational power of
the network, the pool is able to grow its secret extension much longer.
From Figures 5.8 and 5.9, the secret extension grows up to a maximum
of about 15 blocks when α = 0.4, 40 blocks when α = 0.475, and 80
blocks when α = 0.5.
 If 0 < α < 0.5 as deﬁned by Equation 1.2, the honest nodes are bound
to catch up to the pool even when the pool has a suﬃciently large lead.
Figure 5.9 shows that the secret extension grows to an extent of having
40 blocks when α = 0.475, but the honest nodes catch up, reducing the
lead of the pool. However, when the pool commands at least half the
computational power of the network, once the pool builds a suﬃcient
lead, the honest nodes may never catch up during the time period simu-
lated. This is shown by the upper line in the two ﬁgures (when α = 0.5,
the selﬁsh pool almost always has a lead of several secret blocks and the
extension grows to a maximum of about 80 blocks).
In the generalized selﬁsh-mine strategy discussed in Chapter 6, we intro-
duce a parameter, minimum leadml, that causes the pool to publish one secret
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. SELFISH-MINE 48
block in reaction to the selﬁsh pool discovering another secret block when the
length of the secret extension equals ml. This ensures that the length of the
secret extension never exceeds ml.
5.2.2.3 The Gatekeeper
According to [32], it is immaterial whether the dishonest miners operate as a
single group, as a collection of groups, or individually.
We investigate whether there is a performance diﬀerence between a dis-
tributed and centralized implementation of the selﬁsh-mine strategy. The
selﬁsh-mine strategy as implemented in [32] is based on the assumption that
there exists a node in the pool acting as a controller, referred to as the gate-
keeper. An illustration of such a conﬁguration is presented in Figure 5.10.
Block Propagation
Node in pool with no copy of blockchain
Gate Keeper with copy of blockchain
Honest node with copy of blockchain
Dishonest pool
Fully interconnected honest nodes
Figure 5.10: Pool with a gatekeeper.
The gatekeeper is a dishonest node in the pool that runs the selﬁsh-mine
algorithm. It is the only dishonest node visible to the honest nodes although
the honest nodes are not aware that the gatekeeper is a dishonest node. The
gatekeeper is the only dishonest node that receives announcements of blocks
from the honest nodes7 and sends published blocks mined by the pool to the
honest nodes. Besides this, the gatekeeper maintains a copy of the blockchain
7It is possible to have variations where all nodes can receive announcements of public
blocks and forward these to the gatekeeper. [32] suggests a Sybil attack that operates this
way with additional non-mining nodes.
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while other nodes in the pool only need to store a single block upon which to
mine.
When a dishonest node mines a block B, it sends a copy of that block to
the gatekeeper which decides what to do with the block B. Depending on the
state of the blockchain, when block B arrives at the gatekeeper, an appropriate
action is selected from below.
 The block is added to the blockchain. If there is a race, block B is
immediately published to all the nodes in the network. When the nodes
in the pool, besides the gatekeeper and the node that mined the block,
receive the published block B, the nodes begin to mine on block B.
 Block B is discarded since it is outdated and the gatekeeper is aware
of an alternative block B′. This is possible due to transmission delays.
Node n which mined block B may not have received the message to mine
on B′. The gatekeeper broadcasts to all nodes in the pool to mine on
block B′.
The gatekeeper is also a miner. Mining at the gatekeeper is always eﬃcient
as it is aware at all times of which block to mine on. Other nodes in the pool
may waste their eﬀort mining on an outdated block due to transmission delays.
All blocks found by the gatekeeper are immediately added to the blockchain
and broadcast to the rest of the nodes in the pool.
Simulation experiments were conducted based on the model presented in
Chapter 4 Section 4.1.1 but with 40 nodes, for the distributed and centralized
implementation of the selﬁsh-mine strategy. The results are shown in Figure
5.11.
The results in Figure 5.11 show that the performance of the centralized
and the distributed implementation of the selﬁsh-mine algorithm are almost
identical for the model under investigation. We agree with [32] that it is
immaterial whether the dishonest nodes act as individuals or as a group.
5.2.2.4 Two Selﬁsh Pools
Since there is no incentive to stop multiple pools from following the selﬁsh-mine
strategy at the same time [23], we investigate the eﬀect of having two selﬁsh
pools following the selﬁsh-mine strategy. Each pool is approximately the same
size and implements the selﬁsh-mine algorithm as described in Section 5.1.
However, each selﬁsh pool does not know of the existence of the other selﬁsh
pool so they only forward secret blocks to nodes in their respective pools. We
computed the combined mining eﬃciency and relative pool revenues of the two
pools and the results are shown in Figures 5.12 and 5.13 respectively.
From Figure 5.12, we observe that selﬁsh mining is proﬁtable (D > 1) for
pool sizes exceeding (combined α ≈ 0.48) when the average block transmission
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Figure 5.11: The relative revenue of the pool for a distributed and a centralized
implementation of the selﬁsh-mine strategy.
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Figure 5.12: The combined mining eﬃciency of two pools in network with an
average communication delay t, 0 ≤ t ≤ 20 seconds.
delay is low but becomes unproﬁtable as the average block transmission delay
increases.
Figure 5.13 shows that the combined relative revenue of the pools is less
than their fair share for all pool sizes. Since the underlying principle in the
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Figure 5.13: The combined relative revenue of two pools in network with an
average communication delay t, t = 10 seconds.
selﬁsh-mine strategy is secrecy and the pools do not share block information,
they negate each other's eﬀorts by revealing competing blocks [23]. Each pool
not only competes with the honest nodes but with the other pool as well,
eﬀectively reducing their revenue. Intuitively, we can see that the greater
the number of selﬁsh pools (following the selﬁsh-mine strategy) present in the
network, the less the beneﬁt in following the selﬁsh-mine strategy.
5.2.3 Is the Selﬁsh-Mine Strategy Proﬁtable?
From Section 5.2.2.1, we saw that when block propagation delays are present,
the selﬁsh-mine strategy becomes proﬁtable for α > 0.3. However, proﬁtability
was measured in terms of the relative pool revenue and this does not necessarily
mean that the pool incorporated more blocks in the main chain when following
the selﬁsh-mine strategy than it would have if it followed the Bitcoin rules. To
elaborate on this, consider the case where the pool incorporates 100 blocks in
the main chain while following the Bitcoin rules and it incorporate 80 blocks
while following the selﬁsh-mine strategy. The rest of the network incorporates
300 and 200 blocks respectively. When we compute the relative revenues,
the pool earns 0.25 while following the Bitcoin rules and earns 0.286 while
following the selﬁsh-mine strategy. It appears as if the pool is doing better
when following the selﬁsh-mine strategy. However, the actual revenue earned
from 80 blocks (2000 bitcoins) is less than the revenue earned from 100 blocks
(2500 bitcoins) at the current coin base rate. Essentially, both the pool and
the rest of the network are worse oﬀ than they would have been if there was
no selﬁsh mining present.
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Miners are assumed to be rational and that the goal of a miner is to max-
imize its revenue within a mining period [32]. Consider the performance of
the pool during a ﬁxed period of mining T . Due to forking, blocks are deleted
during the same period resulting in the pool receiving revenue for Ns blocks
out of the N ′s blocks mined.
We conducted a set of simulation experiments for a network of 40 nodes
with a mining period T = 70 days (10,000 blocks are mined if M = 10) and
0 ≤ α ≤ 0.5. Once again, 12 replications were executed for each experiment.
In experiment 1, the selﬁsh pool follows the selﬁsh-mine strategy with the
average block mining interval M of 10 minutes throughout the mining period
T . In experiment 2, variable M is initially set to 10 minutes. In the real
Bitcoin network, the average mining interval is adjusted every fortnight by
adjusting the diﬃculty, which is the number of leading zeros in the message
digest H, computed over a string comprising the hash of the parent block, the
Merkle root, and the nonce (see Chapter 3 Section 3.3.2). In our simulator,
we use a simplistic approach to model the diﬃculty and mining process. The
time it takes to mine a block is a random number sampled from an exponential
distribution with a rate of change R (0 < R < 1) and mean M = 1/R.
Throughout this thesis, unless otherwise stated, R = 0.1 resulting in an
average M of 10 minutes. Changing R changes M consequently, in our model,
the process of changing the diﬃculty can be modelled by changing R. As
opposed to the approach taken in [34] where the diﬃculty was adjusted at the
beginning of an experiment and kept constant, in experiment 2, the diﬃculty
was adjusted every 2016 blocks (by adjusting R) as is the case in the real
Bitcoin network using the equation
R = Rold + ((Tactual − Texpected)/Mstandard)/Texpected (5.7)
where Tactual minutes is the time it took to mine 2016 blocks, Mstandard = 10
minutes, and Texpected = 20160 minutes is the expected time to mine 2016
blocks. The adjusted M can be computed from R using Equation 5.8
M = 1/R. (5.8)
Experiment 3 is used as a control experiment to assess the performance
of the pool in experiment 1 and 2 and assumes a pool of the same size as in
experiments 1 and 2 except the pool is following honest mining as speciﬁed
by the Bitcoin rules instead of the selﬁsh-mine strategy (experiments 1 and
2). The results for all three experiments are discussed in Section 5.2.3.2 while
Section 5.2.3.1 only compares results from experiment 1 and 3.
5.2.3.1 Pool Mining Eﬃciency (Ps)
Figure 5.14 shows the pool mining eﬃciency (Ps) and the public mining eﬃ-
ciency (Pp) deﬁned in Section 5.2.1.1 for experiment 1 and experiment 3.
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Figure 5.14: The performance of the pool (Ps) and the honest nodes (Pp) in a
40 node network.
It is clear from Figure 5.14 that when selﬁsh mining is present (experiment
1), both the pool and the honest nodes are worse oﬀ than they would have been
if no selﬁsh mining was present (experiment 3). This is because the forking
of the blockchain and deletion of blocks8 that takes place when selﬁsh mining
is present causes the total block generation rate to be reduced (less than 6
blocks are added to the blockchain every hour) and consequently the overall
revenue decreases. According to the Bitcoin speciﬁcation, the block mining
diﬃculty will be automatically adjusted downwards hence increasing the block
generation rate to ensure that the blockchain grows one block longer every 10
minutes on average. The following section investigates the eﬀect of adjusting
the mining diﬃculty.
5.2.3.2 Adjusting the Block Mining Diﬃculty
Hitherto, our results have been based on experiments with a ﬁxed average
mining interval M . In the real Bitcoin network, the reduced overall revenue
generation resulting from the presence of selﬁsh mining would trigger a down-
ward adjustment of the diﬃculty, hence reducing the average mining interval
such that more than 6 blocks are mined every hour, on average, to compen-
sate for the deleted blocks resulting from forks. The results of a comparison
between the performance of the pool when M is ﬁxed and when M is variable
for 0.3 ≤ α < 0.5 are presented in Table 5.1. We consider three experiments.
8Blocks are not deleted from the blockchain in the actual Bitcoin network. The trans-
actions are removed from the block and added to the next block if they are not already
incorporated in another block. The depleted block remains in the blockchain.
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Table 5.1: Variable Mining Rate.
α Experiment Final M Minimum M N ′s Ns Rp
0.30
Experiment 1 10 10 3005 2197 0.2752
Experiment 2 9.77 8.01 3325 2421 0.2743
Experiment 3 10 10 2995 2949 0.2995
0.40
Experiment 1 10 10 4012 3371 0.4492
Experiment 2 9.69 7.51 4562 3823 0.4495
Experiment 3 10 10 4019 3953 0.3994
0.425
Experiment 1 10 10 4237 3649 0.4982
Experiment 2 10 7.2 4870 4185 0.4979
Experiment 3 10 10 4264 4197 0.4243
0.45
Experiment 1 10 10 4488 3979 0.5532
Experiment 2 9.8 7.18 5219 4609 0.5527
Experiment 3 10 10 4533 4463 0.4495
0.475
Experiment 1 10 10 4755 4317 0.6122
Experiment 2 9.97 6.86 5546 5014 0.6097
Experiment 3 10 10 4790 4712 0.4752
Experiment 1: selﬁsh-mine where the diﬃculty is not adjusted. Experiment
2: selﬁsh-mine where the diﬃculty is adjusted according to Equation 5.7. Ex-
periment 3: all nodes are honest and the mining diﬃculty is kept constant
throughout the experiment. Based on the results of the three experiments, we
make the following observations.
 When M is constant, M = 10, the pool always performs worse, in terms
of Ns, when following the selﬁsh-mine strategy (experiment 1) than when
following honest mining (experiment 3) for all values of α.
 For α < 0.45, the pool mines more blocks (N ′s) when following the selﬁsh-
mine strategy (experiment 2) than when following honest mining (ex-
periment 3) owing to the reduction of M introduced in experiment 2.
However, despite the diﬃculty adjustments in experiment 2, the total
number of blocks (Ns) that end up in the main chain is still less when
following the selﬁsh-mine strategy (experiment 2) than when following
honest mining (experiment 3) even when Rp > α. While varying M
results in both the pool and the honest nodes mining more blocks than
in experiment 1 (constant M), both the pool and the honest nodes end
up losing more blocks due to the forking caused by selﬁsh mining [34].
 When Rp > 0.5 (α ≥ 45), adjusting M results in the pool performing
better when following the selﬁsh-mine strategy than it would have when
following honest mining. At this point, the pool incorporates more blocks
into the main chain at the end of a mining period (Ns ) when following the
selﬁsh-mine strategy (experiment 2) than when following honest mining
(experiment 3). Following the selﬁsh-mine strategy now pays oﬀ owing
to the diﬃculty adjustments.
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For every block in the main chain, a reward B is awarded to the miner.
We deﬁne the selﬁsh mining proﬁt P during the mining period T as
P = BNs − C (5.9)
where C is the cost associated with operating the mining rigs during the period
T . We assume that during period T , all n miners (honest and dishonest) are
constantly involved in solving the cryptographic puzzle each at a cost c (our
model assumes uniform hashing power for all miners hence the uniform costs
c of operating each individual rig). During this time, the pool (collective cost
for all miners in the pool) incurs a cost
C = cαn (5.10)
to mine a total of N ′s blocks where n is the total number of nodes (rigs) in
the network. The cost C is independent of the strategy followed by the pool
(honest or selﬁsh) and the number of blocks mined N ′s. Since B
9 and C are
constant, it is in the interest of the pool when α < 0.45 to follow honest mining
as this maximizes Ns and consequently P as shown in Table 5.1. This is for the
case where the diﬃculty is adjusted to ensure that on average, the blockchain
grows 6 blocks longer every hour as is the case in the real Bitcoin network. For
the case where the diﬃculty is kept constant, selﬁsh mining is unproﬁtable (in
terms of P ) for all values of α.
We further showed in [34] that the reduced diﬃculty not only results in
increasing the overall revenue generation but also increases the number of
forks. This can aﬀord a means for the honest nodes to detect that some
miners are being dishonest.
5.2.3.3 Network Superiority
The network superiority [4] ns is the ability of an attacker, in this case, the
selﬁsh pool, to quickly learn of any new public blocks and to quickly propagate
its published blocks through the Bitcoin network. Eyal and Sirer [32] propose
a strategy, the Sybil attack, that if eﬀectively implemented grants the selﬁsh
pool total network superiority. When ns = 1, the pool is said to have total
network superiority. In essence, this means that with the current Bitcoin
implementation, the pool has the ability to inﬂuence the rate at which pool
blocks are propagated through the network consequently, winning all races. In
our simulation model, the communication delay between two nodes a distance
µ apart is given by
delay = kAN(µ, σ) (5.11)
where k = 1 − ns, A is a scaling constant, and N(µ, σ) is a random number
sampled from a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ.
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Figure 5.15: The relative revenue when the pool has total network superiority
(k = 0).
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Figure 5.16: The performance of the pool (Ps) when following selﬁsh and
honest mining with varying k for α = 0.4.
In order to investigate the eﬀect of ns on the performance of the pool,
we conducted a set of simulation experiments where the communication delay
involving any dishonest node was subject to diﬀerent values of k, 0 ≤ k ≤ 1.
When ns = 1, the pool has total network superiority. In this scenario (k = 0),
9The reward is halved every 210,000 blocks but is currently at 25 bitcoins per block.
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the pool can propagate its published blocks instantly. On the other hand,
communication between honest nodes was subject to delays (as expressed in
Equation 5.11) with k = 1 in all experiments, representing the inability of the
honest nodes to inﬂuence the propagation of their blocks through the network.
Figure 5.15 compares the relative pool revenue Rp when the pool has to-
tal network superiority, represented by the line labelled relative pool revenue
(ns = 1), and when our usual delay model is used, represented by the line la-
belled relative pool revenue (normal delay model). When ns = 1, Figure 5.15
shows that the pool always performs better in terms of the relative revenue
when following the selﬁsh-mine strategy than when following honest mining
for any pool size, α. This means that as far as relative revenue is concerned,
the selﬁsh-mine strategy is proﬁtable for any arbitrarily small pool with total
network superiority.
The performance of the pool in terms of the pool mining eﬃciency Ps
when following honest mining and selﬁsh mining for 0 ≤ k ≤ 1 and α = 0.4
is shown in Figure 5.16. Figure 5.16 shows that the pool loses more blocks
when following the selﬁsh-mine strategy than when following honest mining,
hence the lower value of Ps for all values of k. It is interesting to note that
even in the situation where the pool has total network superiority, ns ≈ 1, our
simulation model shows that the pool still loses more blocks when following
the selﬁsh-mine strategy as proposed by [32]. This further goes to show that
it remains in the interest of the pool to follow honest mining.
5.3 Conclusion
Based on the results of our experiments, we make the following conclusions
about the selﬁsh-mine strategy.
1. The selﬁsh-mine strategy as proposed in [32] seems to be a proﬁtable
strategy when evaluated in terms of the relative revenue and mining eﬃ-
ciency. However, we disagree with the assertion in [32] that an arbitrarily
small pool can proﬁt, in terms of the relative revenue, by following the
selﬁsh-mine strategy. Our simulation results show that the selﬁsh-mine
strategy is proﬁtable, in terms of the relative revenue, for α > 0.3. This
holds true for a network model where we do not assume instantaneous
communication or the ability of the selﬁsh pool to achieve total network
superiority [4] by implementing a Sybil attack [32] for example.
2. Block propagation delays aﬀect the proﬁtability of the selﬁsh-mine strat-
egy as opposed to the assumption in [32] where communication is instan-
taneous. Our simulation model is more faithful to the Bitcoin network
since we take block propagation delays into account [26]. However, we
observe that it is immaterial whether the average block transmission de-
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lay in the network is 1 second or 10 seconds. The selﬁsh-mine strategy
yields identical results for all non-zero communication delays.
3. We further showed that any pool can proﬁt from selﬁsh mining as claimed
in [32], in terms of the relative revenue, if the pool can achieve total
network superiority. Although [32] gives proposals of how an attacker can
achieve total network superiority, we are not convinced of the practicality
of this attack in the real Bitcoin network.
4. We further showed that if the pool does not achieve network superiority,
the selﬁsh-mine strategy is only proﬁtable (actual revenue earned) when
α ≥ 0.45 only if the mining diﬃculty is lowered.
5. It is immaterial whether a distributed or centralized implementation of
the selﬁsh-mine strategy is followed by the selﬁsh pool. The performance
of the distributed and the centralized implementation is almost identical.
6. The presence of multiple pools following a the selﬁsh-mine strategy is
counter productive to each pool.
7. Above all, if miners are rational and wish to maximize their revenue
(proﬁt) from mining, it is in their interest to follow honest mining as this
maximizes their proﬁt P (actual revenue earned during a mining period)
for 0 ≤ α < 45.
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Chapter 6
Genetic Optimization of
Selﬁsh-Mine
6.1 Genetic Algorithms
Genetic Algorithms (GAs) are often considered to be a form of artiﬁcial intel-
ligence. They are an adaptive heuristic search technique based on Darwin's
theory of evolution [51]. GAs are generally used in search and optimization
problems. They perform a random yet intelligent search that is directed to-
wards an optimal region within the search space by leveraging the history of
the search. A GA is designed to mimic the processes of evolution in natural
systems that exhibit survival of the ﬁttest. The struggle for survival among
individuals in such natural systems results in the weaker individuals being re-
placed by the ﬁtter ones [75]. GAs exploit this property to ensure that the
ﬁttest (optimal) solution(s) to a problem is (are) found.
The focus of research in GAs has been robustness [37]. The implications of
robustness for many systems are numerous. For example, redesigns which are
usually costly may be avoided if systems can be made more robust. Robustness
also entails that existing systems are enabled to better perform their functions
if higher levels of adaptation can be achieved.
GAs have been applied in many areas from engineering to business, ad-
dressing routing optimization in telecommunication networks, computer gam-
ing, engineering design, robotics, optimization of analysis of chemical kinetics
and ﬁnance and investment strategies to mention a few examples.
6.1.1 Overview
A typical genetic algorithm requires,
 a genetic representation of the solution domain and
 a ﬁtness function to evaluate the solution domain.
59
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Usually, a candidate solution is represented as an array of bits [51]. The use
of diﬀerent types of arrays and structures can be employed in essentially the
same way. The following key terms are deﬁned.
 Generation: a population of n individuals.
 Individual: a point in the search space representing a possible (candi-
date) solution to the problem, coded as a ﬁxed length vector of variables.
An individual is analogous to a chromosome and the variables to genes,
thus an individual's composition is comprised of several genes.
GAs solve a problem by enacting the survival of the ﬁttest among n individuals
[75]. A ﬁtness score is assigned to each individual. The ﬁtness score is used
to measure how good (a solution to the problem) the individual is. The GA's
objective is to ﬁnd the individual(s) with the optimal (or near optimal) ﬁtness
score(s). To achieve this, the GA evolves generations of individuals.
Selective breeding is applied by selecting individuals (parents) with higher
ﬁtness scores to reproduce. Consequently, individuals (parents) with superior
ranking are given more opportunities to produce descendants so that some of
the characteristics from each parent are passed on. Since only n individuals are
maintained per generation, room must be made for new arrivals, consequently
individuals (with lower ﬁtness scores) are removed and replaced by the new
individuals. In this way, in succeeding generations, more desirable solutions
will dominate.
Iteratively, new generations are produced comprising individuals with more
desirable characteristics on average, and it is expected that this will be the
consistent trend for all successive generations. In the long run, once individuals
in each successive generation are no diﬀerent (in terms of ﬁtness) from previous
generations, the algorithm is said to have converged.
6.1.2 Implementation Details
The evolution of the GA usually starts from a generation of randomly gener-
ated individuals. After the initial generation, the algorithm evolves through
the application of following operators.
 Selection: This is how survival of the ﬁttest is implemented. Individuals
are evaluated using a ﬁtness function and the ﬁtter individuals are given
preference, allowing them to pass on their genes to the next generation1.
The ﬁtness function can be implemented as an objective function to be
maximized (or minimized) or by a subjective judgment.
1Evaluating the ﬁtness of an individual can be very time-consuming depending on the ﬁt-
ness function, consequently certain selection methods evaluate the ﬁtness of each individual
while other methods evaluate only a random sample of the population.
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 Crossover: Mating between individuals is implemented as a crossover
function. This is the prime factor that distinguishes GAs from other
optimization techniques. Consider two individuals, S1 = 000111 and
S2 = 101010 which are chosen from the population using the selection
operator. A random point along the strings is chosen. This is referred to
as the crossover site. The strings are split at the crossover point and the
resulting sub-strings are used to generate new individuals such that each
individual is composed of two sub-strings, one from each parent. The
two individuals that would result in crossing S1 and S2 if the crossover
point is 2 are S1′ = 001010 and S2′ = 100111. These are added to the
next generation and it is likely that ﬁtter individuals are created by this
process of recombining portions of good individuals.
 Mutation: Mutation introduces random modiﬁcations to individuals.
A portion of the new individuals has some of their bits ﬂipped with a
low probability. The goal of mutation is to maintain diversity within the
population and inhibit premature convergence [75].
As expected, each operator has its strengths and weakness. For example,
using selection alone will tend to ﬁll the population with copies of the best
individuals from the population while the selection and crossover operators
will tend to cause the algorithm to converge on a sub-optimal solution. For
the best results, a combination of all operators is used. The following outlines
how a typical GA would operate [75].
1. Begin by randomly initializing a population(t), t = 0.
2. Evaluate the ﬁtness of each individual in the population(t) using the
ﬁtness function.
3. Repeat the following until the termination criteria are satisﬁed.
 Use the selection operator to select highly ranked individuals from
the population(t) to be parents.
 Apply the crossover function on parents creating population(t+1).
 Apply the mutation operator on population(t+ 1).
 Evaluate the ﬁtness of each individual in population(t+ 1).
Several criteria exist for terminating a GA. The usual ones are listed below.
 An individual is found that satisﬁes the minimum ﬁtness threshold.
 The maximum number of generations to evolve is reached.
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 The algorithm converges (new individuals are no diﬀerent from those in
previous generations).
 A combination of the above.
6.2 Application to Selﬁsh-Mine
6.2.1 General Selﬁsh-Mine
In order to apply GA optimization to the selﬁsh-mine strategy, we begin by
specifying a generalized implementation of the selﬁsh-mine algorithm [36]. Ac-
cording to [4], selﬁsh-mine is a specialized case of a greater class of block
discarding attacks referred to as stk, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞, where st0 is honest
mining, st1 selﬁsh-mine as proposed in [32] and stk, k > 1 are variations of
selﬁsh-mine claimed to be more proﬁtable than st1, which is more proﬁtable
than st0.
The general selﬁsh-mine algorithm represents a greater variety of block dis-
carding attacks than stk. A speciﬁcation of the general selﬁsh-mine algorithm
[36] is presented in Algorithm 2 based on Algorithm 1 in Chapter 5 and its
operation is determined by the parameter vector v = (ml, p2, p3, d2, d3, dsl, ra)
described below.
 ml is an integer such that ml ≥ 0. ml denotes the minimum lead (length
of the secret extension) required by the pool in order to publish one secret
block in reaction to the pool discovering another secret block. The values
of ml are interpreted as follows.
ml = 0 means that blocks are never published except in reaction to the
pool learning of a new public block. This is the case for the selﬁsh-mine
strategy as proposed by [32].
ml = 1 means that the pool immediately publishes secret blocks once
they are discovered. This is representative of honest mining.
ml > 1 means the pool publishes one block when the secret extension is
ml long. This may be necessary when the pool is large in order to limit
the length of the secret extension.
 p2, p3 are integers. They denote the number of blocks the selﬁsh pool
reveals in reaction to the pool learning of a new public block when lead =
2 or lead ≥ 3 respectively. The lead is deﬁned as lead = ns−np where ns
and np are the serial numbers (depth) of the last secret block and public
block known to the pool respectively.
In a network characterized by communication delays, it may be advanta-
geous to publish more blocks than recommended by [32]. This is because
public blocks may have been announced but are delayed in reaching the
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 6. GENETIC OPTIMIZATION OF SELFISH-MINE 63
pool due to communication delays. Publishing more than one block en-
sures that the secret blocks have a high chance of being accepted by the
honest nodes. This compensates for public blocks that may still be in
transit [36].
 d2, d3, dsl are integers such that 0 ≤ d2, d3, dsl ≤ 1200 seconds. These
values denote the pool's delays in publishing a block except when there
is a race or lead is reduced to one. In such cases, the secret block is
published immediately. In all other cases, the pool delays publishing a
block by d2, d3 seconds in reaction to the announcement of a public block
when the lead = 2 or lead ≥ 3 respectively. The delay dsl seconds is used
for publications in reaction to the pool discovering another secret block.
The dsl parameter is only used when ml > 0.
The idea behind these delays is to deny the honest nodes the opportunity
to mine on the block that will form part of the main chain. This increases
the chances of the pool being rewarded revenue for the next successive
secret blocks.
 ra is an integer that denotes whether the pool will engage in a race or
not when lead is reduced to zero.
ra = 0 means the pool does not engage in a race when lead is reduce to
zero. Instead, the pool immediately abandons the secret extension and
begins mining on the block in the public chain. This may be necessary
when the pool contains a small number of nodes and the chances of
winning the race are minimal as the pool may waste computational eﬀort
mining on the formerly secret block.
ra = 1 means the pool engages in a race when lead is reduced to zero.
This is the case for the selﬁsh-mine strategy as proposed by [32].
The general selﬁsh-mine algorithm includes honest mining given by v =
(1,2,2,2,2, 0, 0) and the selﬁsh-mine strategy as proposed by [32] given by
v = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1) where 2 represents an inapplicable parameter. Equipped
with the above, we can now use a GA to ﬁnd an optimal conﬁguration of the
parameter vector v that yields near maximal revenue for the selﬁsh pool.
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Algorithm 2 The general selﬁsh-mine algorithm.
1: procedure Initialize
2: read ml, p2, p3, d2, d3, dsl, ra
3: secretExtension←empty
4: race← FALSE
5: mine on the last block of the chain
6: end procedure
7: procedure SecretMine(block)
8: append block to secretExtension: ns = ns + 1
9: lead← ns − np . The last block of secretExtension has serial ns
10: if race = TRUE and ra = 1 then
11: PUBLISH(1, 0)
12: race←FALSE
13: secretExtension←empty
14: else if lead ≥ ml > 0 then
15: PUBLISH(1, dsl)
16: end if
17: mine on block
18: end procedure
19: procedure HonestMine(block)
20: append block to blockchain
21: np ← np + 1 . the last public block has serial np
22: lead← ns − np . the last block of secretExtension has serial ns
23: if lead < 0 or (lead = 0 and ra = 0) then
24: race←FALSE
25: secretExtension←empty
26: mine on block np
27: else if lead = 0 and ra = 1 then
28: race←TRUE
29: PUBLISH(1, 0)
30: mine on block ns
31: else if lead = 1 then
32: PUBLISH(2, 0)
33: mine on block ns
34: else if lead = 2 then
35: PUBLISH(p2, d2)
36: mine on block ns
37: else
38: PUBLISH(p3, d3)
39: mine on block ns
40: end if
41: end procedure
42: procedure Publish(integer n, integer delay)
43: remove n blocks from secretExtension
44: publish n blocks after delay seconds
45: end procedure
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6.2.2 Simulations and Results
We extended our simulator to use a C++ Genetic Algorithm Library, GAlib,
developed at MIT 2 to search for an optimal conﬁguration of the parameter
vector v that yields better performance for the selﬁsh pool. GAlib was selected
for the following reasons.
 It is one of the popular libraries available for C++ genetic programming.
 It is fairly easy to set up and has extensive documentation and examples.
 It is object-oriented making it easy to extend.
 Most importantly, the default operators available in the library were
suﬃcient for our application.
We performed a GA search using rank-based selection. In the ﬁrst set of
experiments, we maximized the relative pool revenue Rp. In the second set of
experiments, we maximized the number of conﬁrmed blocks (the total number
of blocks mined by the pool that end up in the main chain at the end of the
simulation) Ns. While the general trend is to examine selﬁsh-mine based on
the relative revenue [4, 32, 63], we considered both Rp and Ns since we showed
in Chapter 5 Section 5.2.3 that having a higher relative revenue does not
necessarily entail more conﬁrmed blocks in the main chain. In addition, the
parameter vector v was constrained as follows: 1 ≤ ml ≤ 15 , 1 ≤ p2, p3 ≤ 3,
and 0 ≤ d2, d3, dsl ≤ 1200. Other details of the GA conﬁguration are as follows.
 The population size (individuals per generation) popSize = 40.
 The mutation rate pmut = 5%.
 The crossover rate pcross = 50%.
 The convergence threshold was set to 99%.
 The GA looked back nconvergence generations to check for convergence
(nconvergence = 20).
 The GA evolved a maximum of ngen generations before termination
(ngen = 100).
 The GA search terminated when either the algorithm converged or ngen
generations were evolved.
A summary of how our GA is implemented is given in Algorithm 3.
2This research was performed using GAlib, a library of genetic algorithm components
(http://lancet.mit.edu/ga/).
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Algorithm 3 The genetic algorithm.
1: procedure GA(ngen, popSize, pcross, pmut, nconvergence)
2: benchmarkScore← score of standard selﬁsh-mine
3: gen← 0
4: converged = FALSE
5: randomly generate popSize genomes G(gen)
6: while gen < ngen and converged = FALSE do
7: for all g ∈ G(gen) do
8: g(rank)← OBJECTIVEFUNCTION(g)
9: end for
10: select pcross% genomes in G(gen) based on rank to mate
11: replace pcross% genomes in G(gen) with new oﬀspring
12: gen← gen+ 1
13: mutate pmut% of genomes in G(gen)
14: if nconvergence ≥ gen then
15: if algorithm has converged then
16: converged← TRUE
17: end if
18: end if
19: end while
20: return best genome
21: end procedure
22: procedure getScore(ml, p2, p3, d2, d3, dsl, ra)
23: run general selﬁsh-mine simulation with given parameters
24: return Rp or Ns
25: end procedure
26: procedure ObjectiveFunction(g)
27: val← GETSCORE(g(ml), g(p2), g(p3), g(d2), g(d3), g(dsl), g(ra))
28: return val − benchmarkScore
29: end procedure
The results of the ﬁrst set of experiments in which we attempted to max-
imize Rp are shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 on the other
hand show the results of the GA optimization when attempting to maximize
Ns. In both cases, experiments were conducted based on two 40-node net-
work models, the ﬁrst model having instantaneous communication and the
second, characterized by an average of 10 seconds communication delay. In
addition, the distributed implementation of the general selﬁsh-mine algorithm
(no gatekeeper) was used while mining 5000 blocks (35 days of mining) for
all simulation experiments conducted during the ﬁtness evaluation of each in-
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Table 6.1: GA optimization of Rp in a network with instantaneous block trans-
mission.
α
Ns Rp Conﬁguration (general selﬁsh-mine)
H S G H S G ml p2 p3 d2 d3 dsl ra
0.05 255 46 253 0.05 0.01 0.05 2 3 1 645 527 169 0
0.10 505 165 495 0.10 0.04 0.10 2 3 1 645 527 169 0
0.15 763 344 763 0.15 0.08 0.16 13 2 1 805 85 1186 0
0.20 1005 547 1004 0.20 0.13 0.21 5 2 1 461 908 927 0
0.25 1255 799 1255 0.25 0.19 0.27 13 2 1 805 85 1186 0
0.30 1493 1061 1493 0.30 0.27 0.33 13 2 1 805 85 1186 0
0.35 1743 1357 1738 0.35 0.36 0.40 14 1 1 1176 94 584 0
0.40 1995 1665 1966 0.40 0.45 0.50 14 1 1 1176 94 584 0
0.45 2243 1987 2063 0.45 0.56 0.63 14 1 1 1176 94 584 0
0.475 2365 2140 2365 0.47 0.61 0.73 14 1 1 1176 94 584 0
Table 6.2: GA optimization of Rp in a network with block transmission delays.
α
Ns Rp Conﬁguration (general selﬁsh-mine)
H S G H S G ml p2 p3 d2 d3 dsl ra
0.05 252 79 252 0.05 0.02 0.05 2 3 1 645 527 169 0
0.10 496 223 494 0.10 0.05 0.10 2 3 1 645 527 169 0
0.15 753 442 761 0.15 0.10 0.16 13 2 1 805 85 1186 0
0.20 994 673 986 0.20 0.16 0.21 12 2 3 19 560 372 0
0.25 1242 957 1251 0.25 0.24 0.27 7 2 1 998 292 33 0
0.30 1476 1216 1477 0.30 0.31 0.33 5 2 1 461 908 927 0
0.35 1724 1493 1740 0.35 0.39 0.41 14 1 1 1176 94 584 0
0.40 1974 1795 1988 0.40 0.49 0.51 14 1 1 1176 94 584 0
0.45 2220 2085 2136 0.45 0.60 0.65 15 3 1 489 19 692 1
0.475 2342 2223 2293 0.47 0.70 0.73 15 3 1 489 19 692 1
Table 6.3: GA optimization of Ns in a network with instantaneous block trans-
mission.
α
Ns Rp Conﬁguration (general selﬁsh-mine)
H S G H S G ml p2 p3 d2 d3 dsl ra
0.05 255 46 253 0.05 0.01 0.05 2 3 1 645 527 169 0
0.10 505 165 505 0.10 0.04 0.10 13 2 1 805 85 1186 0
0.15 763 344 763 0.15 0.08 0.16 13 2 1 805 85 1186 0
0.20 1005 547 1003 0.20 0.13 0.21 7 2 2 348 24 160 0
0.25 1255 799 1255 0.25 0.20 0.27 13 2 1 805 85 1186 0
0.30 1493 1061 1493 0.30 0.27 0.33 13 2 1 805 85 1186 0
0.35 1743 1357 1738 0.35 0.36 0.41 13 2 1 805 85 1186 0
0.40 1995 1665 1995 0.40 0.45 0.50 9 2 1 1087 282 108 0
0.45 2243 1987 2224 0.45 0.56 0.62 9 2 1 1087 282 108 0
0.475 2365 2140 2365 0.50 0.61 0.66 7 2 1 998 292 33 0
dividual in a generation. We also note that the GA was able to ﬁnd several
equally ranked individuals (with diﬀerent conﬁgurations of v), with equal ﬁt-
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Table 6.4: GA optimization of Ns in a network with block transmission delays.
α
Ns Rp Conﬁguration (general selﬁsh-mine)
H S G H S G ml p2 p3 d2 d3 dsl ra
0.05 252 79 252 0.05 0.02 0.05 2 3 1 645 527 169 0
0.10 496 223 503 0.10 0.05 0.10 7 2 3 979 334 52 0
0.15 753 442 761 0.15 0.10 0.16 13 2 1 805 85 1186 0
0.20 994 673 1001 0.20 0.16 0.21 13 2 1 805 85 1186 0
0.25 1242 957 1248 0.25 0.24 0.27 13 2 1 805 85 1186 0
0.30 1476 1216 1480 0.30 0.31 0.32 3 2 1 504 132 99 0
0.35 1724 1493 1731 0.35 0.39 0.38 5 2 3 1092 42 739 0
0.40 1974 1795 1980 0.40 0.49 0.44 5 3 3 781 19 1158 0
0.45 2220 2085 2224 0.45 0.60 0.51 6 1 3 979 33 61 0
0.475 2342 2223 2342 0.47 0.70 0.55 4 2 2 955 0 1181 0
ness scores. In the tables, we only list the ones the GA selected randomly from
a set of equal ranking best individuals at the end of each search for a given
α. The column H gives the performance of the pool when following honest
mining, column S, when following the standard selﬁsh-mine strategy, and col-
umn G, when following the general selﬁsh-mine strategy with the parameter
vector v conﬁgured as shown is the columns labelled conﬁguration (general
selﬁsh-mine). Based on the results in Table 6.1 to 6.4, we make the following
observations.
 Maximizing Rp does not always result in a larger Ns value.
 Standard selﬁsh-mine always performs worse than honest mining in terms
of Ns even when Rp when the pool follows selﬁsh-mine (column S) is
greater than Rp when the pool follows honest mining (column H). This
further conﬁrms our ﬁndings in Chapter 53.
 There are conﬁgurations of the parameter vector v that yield higher Rp
than standard selﬁsh-mine [32] at the same time increasing the value of
Ns, such that Ns(selfish) ≥ Ns(honest) for all α.
 Ns when delay = 0, is greater than Ns when delay > 0 (delay as deﬁned
by equation 5.11 in Chapter 5 Section 5.2.3.3, taking k = 1).
 Even when the pool is small (α ≈ 0.05), implementing a well conﬁgured
general selﬁsh-mine strategy, allows the pool to perform slightly better
than or at least the same as it would have by following honest mining
both in terms of Rp and Ns.
3The results agree with those for standard selﬁsh-mine with constant diﬃculty. Since
only 5000 blocks are mined during the ﬁtness evaluation of each individual, adjusting the
mining diﬃculty has a negligible eﬀect on the performance of the pool in terms on Ns as
opposed to the results shown in Chapter 5 Section 5.2.3.2.
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Exploiting the additional degrees of freedom that the parametersml, p2, p3,
d2, d3, dsl, and ra aﬀord the selﬁsh pool, the pool can accrue higher revenue.
For example, by choosing whether to engage in races or not when lead = 0,
the pool can avoid wasting computational eﬀort mining on the secret branch.
This can be beneﬁcial in a network characterized by block transmission
delays (Tables 6.2 and 6.4) when the pool contains a small number of nodes
making the probability of winning the race minimal. Since our network has
only 40 nodes, γ < 0.5 as shown in Figure 6.1 even when α = 0.5 (only 20
nodes are dishonest). This means that the probability of the secret extension
being extended in the next round of mining during a race is less than 0.5
unless the next block is mined by the pool. As a result, the pool may opt out
of engaging in races as this may be more proﬁtable as shown in Tables 6.1
to 6.4 (ra = 0 for all α). This is compounded by the possibility that due to
block propagation delays, the pool may not be aware of a public block that
has already been mined on top of the public branch but delayed to reach the
pool.
In addition, for the case where there is instantaneous communication (Ta-
bles 6.1 and 6.3), the pool may opt out of engaging in races regardless of the
number of nodes in the pool. This is because by the time a competing public
block reaches the selﬁsh pool, it will have reached all honest nodes as well,
making it impossible for the secret extension to be extended in the next round
of mining (taking into account the processing time required before the pool
publishes the competing secret block) unless the next block is mined by the
pool. However, if the pool has total network superiority, the pool can safely
engage in races at all times.
We further selected the conﬁguration of v found to be optimal for α = 0.4
and ran some simulation experiments while varying the network superiority of
the pool as done in Chapter 5 Section 5.2.3.3. The mining eﬃciency of the pool
(Ps) when following honest mining, the standard selﬁsh-mine strategy and the
general selﬁsh-mine strategy with v = (5, 3, 3, 781, 19, 1158, 0) are plotted in
Figure 6.2. We observe that the general selﬁsh-mine strategy yields almost
the same performance as honest mining when the pool is highly connected
(k = 0 implying that ns = 1) but consistently slightly better than honest
mining or much better than the standard selﬁsh-mine strategy for the rest of
the scenarios.
6.3 Conclusion
Notwithstanding the diﬀerences in approach, like [4] and [63], we conclude
that there are more proﬁtable block discarding strategies or more accurately,
variations of the selﬁsh-mine strategy as proposed in [32] that enable the pool
to perform better than is possible with standard selﬁsh-mine or st1 [4]. These
strategies enable the pool to accumulate relative revenue Rp in excess of its
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Figure 6.2: The performance of the pool (Ps) with varying k for α = 0.4.
fair share even for small pool sizes (α ≈ 0.15), and the pool incorporates a
statistically insigniﬁcant number of additional blocks (Ns) into the main chain
than it would have by following honest mining.
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Summary and Conclusions
7.1 Summary
In this thesis, we investigated the performance of selﬁsh bitcoin mining un-
der block propagation delays. Chapter 1 presented a survey of related work,
the background to the problem and research objectives. In Chapter 2, we pre-
sented an outline of the evolution of currencies and payments systems from the
primitive barter economy to the present day of digital currencies and payment
systems. We made a comparison of the various electronic payment systems
and discussed in brief some of the popular altcoins. We endeavored to discuss
the details of Bitcoin in Chapter 3. It was in this chapter where the architec-
ture and underlying technical details of Bitcoin were presented, including an
overview of the Bitcoin ecosystem. We further compared Bitcoin with other
payment systems like Visa.
Beginning with Chapter 4 in which we introduced our discrete event simula-
tor, we began presenting the results of our simulation of the Bitcoin blockchain
dynamics. We ﬁrst assumed in Chapter 4 that all nodes are honest, abiding by
the Bitcoin protocol rules. We performed simulation experiments to validate
our simulation model. We showed that our results agree with those observed
from the real Bitcoin network [26], conﬁrming that our simulations for the net-
work model under investigation yield results that are close to those observed
in the real Bitcoin network.
In Chapter 5, we assumed that a fraction of the miners commanding α of
the total computing power of the network was dishonest. We presented the
selﬁsh-mine algorithm as proposed by [32] and deﬁned our evaluation criteria,
relative revenue, and mining eﬃciency. We presented the results based on
the evaluation criteria for the various simulation experiments we conducted
which were based on the simulation model introduced in Chapter 4, taking
block propagation delays into account. In other experiments, we explicitly
assumed instantaneous block transmission in the network and compared the
results using the said evaluation criteria. We further investigated whether
71
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selﬁsh mining is proﬁtable and conducted some experiments to investigate the
eﬀectiveness of the Sybil attack proposed in [32] using a simple model. Finally,
we showed that it is in the interest of the pool to follow honest mining.
In Chapter 6, we introduced the generalized selﬁsh-mine algorithm based
on the parameter vector v = (ml, p2, p3, d2, d3, dsl, ra). We performed a search
for the optimal conﬁguration of v that yields better performance for the pool
than standard selﬁsh mining using GA optimization. We showed that the
optimal conﬁguration of the general selﬁsh-mine strategy as found by the GA
performed consistently better than the standard selﬁsh-mine strategy under
all circumstances both in terms of the total blocks mined by the pool that end
up in the main chain at the end of the simulation and relative revenue of the
pool. We further showed, using the same criteria, that the general selﬁsh-mine
strategy performed as good as, but not better than honest mining.
7.2 Conclusions and Future Work
The goals of subversive mining strategies in the Bitcoin network seem to be
twofold, namely,
1. to allow an attacker to gain more rewards than they would gain from
following the protocol rules and
2. to break the Bitcoin protocol (explained below).
In view of this, we conclude that selﬁsh mining is a threat to the Bitcoin
system. In terms of the goals of subversive strategies presented above and
when communication is instantaneous, selﬁsh mining achieves both. Selﬁsh
mining as proposed in [32] not only allows the selﬁsh pool to earn more than
their fair share of the mining revenue (relative pool revenue), it potentially
breaks the Bitcoin system.
Central to Bitcoin, is the idea of a decentralized payment system. For this
reason, breaking Bitcoin should be understood in the following context. If self-
ish mining is successfully carried out by an attacker, the honest nodes perform
poorly in terms of the revenue earned. Eventually, the honest nodes will either
join the pool or leave the network, at which point Bitcoin ceases to be decen-
tralized (broken). However, we also note that under block propagation delays,
selﬁsh mining as proposed in [32] only begins to yield proﬁts, not in terms of
the relative revenue but in terms of the actual blocks credited, when the pool
commands more than 40% of the total hashing power of the network, provided
the diﬃculty is adjusted downwards. Selﬁsh mining is unproﬁtable in terms of
actual blocks credited if the diﬃculty is kept constant. Notwithstanding this,
if the pool can achieve total network superiority, selﬁsh mining becomes prof-
itable even when the pool is relatively small. Furthermore, we conclude that
the best possible strategy an attacker can implement is an optimally conﬁgured
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general selﬁsh-mine strategy. This increases the attacker's relative revenue, but
the attacker accrues a statistically insigniﬁcant number of additional blocks in
the main chain than the attacker would have when following honest mining.
In essence, a well conﬁgured general selﬁsh-mine strategy allows the pool to
perform as well as when mining honestly for any pool size even under block
propagation delays. In this sense, the generalized form of selﬁsh mining poses
a greater threat to Bitcoin than the standard selﬁsh mining strategy.
However, the network model employed in our investigations was simplis-
tic. It would be interesting to investigate these attacks using a more realistic
network model that is as close to reality as possible, taking into account the
Bitcoin P2P overlay network characteristics and topology. It would be inter-
esting to learn whether this would have any eﬀect on our ﬁndings and therefore
presents an opportunity for possible future work. In addition, it would be in-
sightful to carry out a thorough analysis of possible and already suggested
measures to mitigate these block discarding attacks.
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Appendix A
Summarized Bitcoin Rules
The main branch of the blockchain is deﬁned as the branch with highest total
diﬃculty. The total diﬃculty of a branch is the time in expectation it took to
mine the blocks in the branch. There are 3 categories of blocks,
1. blocks in the main branch; the transactions in these blocks are considered
to be tentatively conﬁrmed,
2. blocks on side branches oﬀ the main branch; these blocks have tentatively
lost the race to be in the main branch,
3. orphan blocks; these are blocks which do not link into the main branch,
normally because of a missing predecessor or nth-level predecessor.
Blocks in the ﬁrst two categories form a tree rooted at the genesis block,
linked by the previous block pointers, which point towards the root. The tree
is almost linear with a few short branches oﬀ the main branch.
A (tagged) block arrives or is mined at a node. The tagged block is either
local (mined at this node) or foreign (mined at another node). Local blocks
are added to the blockchain and broadcast to all the peers. As for the foreign
block category, the following checks are done.
1. Reject the tagged block if a duplicate of the block is present in any of
the three block categories.
2. Check if the previous block (matching the previous block hash in the
tagged block) is in the main branch or a side branch. If not, add the
tagged block to the orphan blocks and query the peer that sent the
tagged block for the previous block.
3. If the previous block is in the main branch or a side branch, add the
tagged block to the block chain. There are three cases.
a) The tagged block extends the main branch: add the tagged block
to the main branch.
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b) The tagged block extends a side branch but does not add enough
diﬃculty to make it become the new main branch: add the tagged
block to the side branch.
c) The tagged block extends a side branch which becomes the new
main branch: add the tagged block to the side branch
i. ﬁnd the fork block on the main branch from which this side
branch forks oﬀ,
ii. redeﬁne the main branch to only go up to the fork block,
iii. for each block on the side branch, from the child of the fork
block to the leaf, add the block to the main branch,
iv. delete each block in the old main branch, from the leaf to the
child of the fork block.
d) For each orphan block, check if the previous block now points to a
valid block in either the main chain or side branch. If so, add the
block to the blockchain and perform checks in (c), or else, leave the
block as is.
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Appendix B
The Three Node Network
B.1 The Three Node Network
The performance of the selﬁsh-mine strategy to some extent depends on the
fraction γ of honest miners who mine on the published block when there is a
race. According to Bitcoin rules, a miner will mine on the ﬁrst block received.
Unlike in [32], where γ is manipulated as wished, in our case, γ is an observation
that is measured.
In order to analyze γ, a three node network conﬁguration was studied.
Three nodes A, B and C are placed on the (x, y) plane as shown in Figure
B.1. Nodes A and B are honest while node C is dishonest. We assume the
communication delay between two nodes is proportional to the distance be-
tween the nodes. In this case, it takes ka seconds to send a message from A to
B, kb seconds from B to C and kc seconds from A to C, where k is a constant.
We consider two approaches; an analytic approach and a simulation model.
The results of our simulations agree with the analytic results.
D
A (honest node) B (honest node)
C (dishonest node)
a
b
c
Figure B.1: The three node network conﬁguration.
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B.2 Analytic Model
Consider the situation where an honest node A discovers a block Ah and trans-
mits it to all nodes1. When the block arrives at the dishonest node C, this
node already knows of a secret block Cs that comprises a secret extension of
length one. Consequently, the blockchain at C forks and the dishonest node
C immediately publishes the secret block Cs causing a race to begin at node
C and, after a delay, at nodes A and B. The race at node A is won by block
Ah. The outcome of the race at node B is more complicated.
Assume that the transmission times between nodes i and j are normally
distributed with a mean proportional to the distance between the two nodes
and with a constant coeﬃcient of variation CV . We are interested in the
probability P that the honest node B receives the block Cs before it receives
block Ah. In the notation of [32], P is referred to as γ.
Let T be the diﬀerence between the arrival time of Cs and Ah at B. Then,
T = TAC + TCB − TAB, (B.1)
where Tij is normally distributed with mean kdij and variance σ
2. Therefore
T is normally distributed with mean
t = k(b+ c− a) (B.2)
and variance
σ2 = k2(CV )2(a2 + b2 + c2), (B.3)
where CV is the coeﬃcient of variation. We wish to calculate the probability
P that T ≤ 0.
A, B and C form a triangle of height D as shown in Figure B.1. Using the
cosine law, we have,
b2 = a2 + c2 − 2ac cos θ, (B.4)
where θ is the angle between a and c. To compute the value of cos θ, we
ﬁrst calculate
sin θ = D/c. (B.5)
Using the identity,
sin2 θ + cos2 θ = 1 (B.6)
and equation B.5, we obtain,
cos θ =
√
1− sin2 θ =
√
1− (D/c)2, (B.7)
thus
b2 = a2 + c2 − 2ac
√
1− (D/c)2. (B.8)
1The model presented in this section is attributed to P.G. Taylor (private communica-
tion).
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When D = 0, then A, B and C are collinear and P = 0.5.
We now compute the probability P that T ≤ 0 for values of 0 < D ≤ 100,
a = 800, c = 500 and CV ∈ {0.001, 0.002, 0.005, 0.01}. In order to compute
the probability P , we use the Python program given in Appendix C.
The results are shown in Table B.1.
Table B.1: Probability P with varying D.
CV = 0.001 CV = 0.002 CV = 0.005 CV = 0.01
D P D P D P D P
1.0 0.4989 1.0 0.4995 1.0 0.4998 1.0 0.4999
10.0 0.3939 10.0 0.4465 10.0 0.4785 10.0 0.4893
20.0 0.141 20.0 0.2953 20.0 0.4148 20.0 0.4572
30.0 0.007865 30.0 0.1136 30.0 0.3145 30.0 0.4046
40.0 9.303E-06 40.0 0.01616 40.0 0.1959 40.0 0.3343
50.0 1.332E-11 50.0 0.0004311 50.0 0.0913 50.0 0.2526
60.0 6.298E-22 60.0 8.918E-07 60.0 0.02803 60.0 0.1697
70.0 1.437E-38 70.0 4.99E-11 70.0 0.004842 70.0 0.09793
80.0 1.363E-63 80.0 2.296E-17 80.0 0.0003916 80.0 0.04654
90.0 2.997E-99 90.0 2.365E-26 90.0 1.207E-05 90.0 0.01737
100.0 6.082E-148 100.0 1.367E-38 100.0 1.137E-07 100.0 0.004831
B.3 Simulation Model
We performed simulation experiments for the three node network conﬁgura-
tion shown in Figure B.1 while varying D from 0 to 100 and values of the
coeﬃcient of variation CV ∈ {0.001, 0.002, 0.005, 0.01}. The communication
delay between two nodes has standard deviation,
σ = kdCV (B.9)
where d is the distance between the two nodes. The results are presented in
Figure B.2. The graph shows that γ = 0.25 when D = 0. This is due to how
γ is calculated in the simulator. Consider the case where node A mines all
public blocks and broadcasts them to nodes B and C. When a block reaches
dishonest node C, it responds by publishing its secret block. A race-counter
is incremented and a γ-counter is incremented or not depending on which
block arrives ﬁrst at B. However, since A discovered the block, the secret
block from C can never reach A before the public block hence the γ-counter
is never incremented at A. At the end of the simulation, the γ-counter/race-
counter is divided by the number of honest nodes, in this case 2, eﬀectively
halving the measurement. However, when the network size increases, this
eﬀect becomes negligible. A normalized form of the graph that takes the
above into consideration is shown in Figure B.3 showing that the observed
value of γ = 0.5 in the simulation model is equal to the probability P = 0.5
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computed in the analytic model in the three node network when D is zero (the
nodes are collinear). In addition, the (D,P ) pairs in Table B.1 and the (D,γ)
pairs in Figure B.3 for corresponding values of CV, closely agree.
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Figure B.2: γ for diﬀerent values of CV in a 3 node network.
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Figure B.3: Normalized γ for diﬀerent values of CV in a 3 node network.
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Appendix C
Numerical Program to Calculate
P in Python
import scipy.stats as ss
import math as math
#values of D
d_list=[1.0,10.0,20.0,30.0,40.0,50.0,60.0,70.0,80.0,90.0,100.0]
#values of CV
cv_list=[0.01, 0.005,0.002,0.001]
#compute the mean given that a,b,c are normally distributed
def compute_mean(a,b,c):
return b+c-a
#compute the standard deviation given that a,b,c are normally
distributed
def compute_std_deviation(a,b,c,CV):
return math.sqrt(CV*CV*(a*a + b*b +c*c))
#compute the probability P that P <= x given the mean and standard
deviation
def compute_probability(x,mean,std_deviation):
return ss.norm.cdf(x, loc = mean, scale=std_deviation)
#do the calculations for varying values of CV and D
def do_computations(a,c):
for CV in cv_list:
print "CV = ", CV
for D in d_list:
#compute the cosine of the angle opposite the unknown side b
cosB = math.sqrt(1 - (D/c)*(D/c))
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b = math.sqrt(a*a + c*c - 2*a*c*cosB) #compute unknown triangle
side b
mean = compute_mean(a,b,c)
std_deviation = compute_std_deviation(a,b,c,CV)
print D,"%.4G" % (compute_probability(0,mean,std_deviation))
print "\n"
#call to execute do_computations for a=500 and c=100
do_computations(800,500)
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